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MORE MARKET-ORIENTED THAN THE UNITED 
STATES AND MORE SOCIALIST THAN CHINA: A 
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC PROPERTY STORY OF 
SINGAPORE 
Jianlin Chen & Jiongzhe Cui † 
Abstract: Compared to the more illustrious conceptualization of private property, 
the conceptualization of public property remains at a surprisingly infantile stage.  The 
very definition of public property is ambiguous.  This article utilizes a comparative case 
study of traffic congestion policies in the United States, China, and Singapore to 
highlight the conceptual pitfalls posed by the current confusion on public property.  This 
article proposes a refined public property framework that offers greater conceptual clarity 
on the real issues at stake.  In particular, this article argues that “property” in public 
property should include regulatory permits while “public” in public property should not 
be distracted by the requirement of public access.  The allocation considerations of 
efficiency and fairness governing conventional public property are equally applicable to 
economically valuable regulatory permits.  Similarly, public access is a mere form of 
allocation that should be changed upon alterations in use pattern arising from 
technological advancement and socioeconomic changes. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Public property matters, or at least it should.  Compared to the more 
illustrious private property, which enjoys legions of books and journal 
articles devoted specifically to the discussion and promotion thereof,1 the 
conceptualization of public property remains at a surprisingly infantile 
stage.2  The very definition of public property is ambiguous.  What does the 
                                                      
†  Jianlin Chen is an Assistant Law Professor at the University of Hong Kong, J.S.D. Candidate 
(University of Chicago), L.L.M. (University of Chicago), L.L.B. (University of Singapore), and is admitted 
to the bar in New York and Singapore.  Jiongzhe Cui is a trainee Solicitor (Leung & Lau), P.C.L.L. (City 
University of Hong Kong), J.D. (City University of Hong Kong), and L.L.B. (Fudan University).  The 
authors wish to thank Lisa Bernstein, Karen Bradshaw Schulz, Richard Cullen, Adi Leibovitch, Chien-Chih 
Lin and the participants of the Chicago Law School Legal Scholarship Workshop for their insightful 
comments and critiques.  Nonetheless, all errors are ours alone. 
1  E.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061 (2012); Vincent 
Chiappetta, The (Practical) Meaning of Property, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 297 (2009); JAMES W. ELY, JR., 
THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed. 
2008); Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 117 (2005); TERRY L. ANDERSON & LAURA E. HUGGINS, PROPERTY RIGHTS: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO FREEDOM & PROSPERITY (2003). 
2  The term “public property” is often featured in the literature.  However, this literature tends to fall 
into two categories that do not advance a coherent understanding of public property.  For a discussion of 
the first category of public property in public law and the importance of property ownership as a criterion, 
see Angela C. Carmella, Symbolic Religious Expression on Public Property: Implications for the Integrity 
of Religious Associations, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 481 (2011); Kate Shelby, Taking Public Interests in 
Private Property Seriously: How the Supreme Court Short-Changes Public Property Rights in Regulatory 
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“public” in public property entail?  Is “public access” a necessary or 
sufficient characteristic of public property?3  What does the “property” in 
public property cover?  Does “property” include regulatory permits 4 
allocated and subjected to the same principles allocating conventional public 
property, such as land?5  This inquiry is not simply a matter of intellectual 
curiosity; it has practical implications for allocating resources and designing 
regulatory schemes.  One manifestation of the quandary caused by the 
underappreciation of public property is traffic congestion policy. 
Public roads—a well-recognized form of public property—are 
plagued by traffic congestion.  Traffic congestion is a major problem in 
urban areas of the United States and around the world 6  and imposes 
substantial time and fuel costs on motorists.  It also results in many negative 
externalities not borne by motorists, such as other types of congestion and 
environmental damage.7  The open-access nature of roads and the difficulty 
commuters face navigating roads make traffic congestion a classic example 
of the “tragedy of the commons.”8  Two types of market-based regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                              
Taking Cases, 24 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45 (2008); Dean Smith, Lawmaking on Federal Lands: 
Criminal Liability and the Public Property Exception of the Administrative Procedure Act, 23 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 313 (2003).  For a discussion of the second category on public property  through 
the comparison of the pros and cons of private property, while assuming that public property is equivalent 
to public access (contrary to private property), see William F. Cloran, The Ownership of Water in Oregon: 
Public Property vs Private Commodity, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 627 (2011); Carol M. Rose, Romans, 
Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 89 (2003); Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and the Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).  In both categories of literature, the discussion of public 
property is ancillary to the main discussion, rather than a targeted inquiry (descriptive or normative) on the 
public property concept.   
3  See infra Part IV.C.3. 
4  Regulatory permits are legal instruments issued by the state to authorize the conduct of certain 
activities by private entities, without which the conduct would be illegal.  They are termed “administrative 
permits” in China, and may also be referred to as licenses, approvals, franchises, and consents.    
5  See infra Parts III.B.2 & III.C.1. 
6  Michael H. Schuitema, Comment, Road Pricing as a Solution to the Harms of Traffic Congestion, 
34 TRANSP. L.J. 81, 85 (2007); ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN, URBAN ECONOMICS 258 (McGraw-Hill 5th ed. 
2003); Kenneth A. Small, Urban Traffic Congestion: A New Approach to the Gordian Knot, in READINGS 
IN URBAN ECONOMICS: ISSUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 409, 409-10 (Robert W. Wassmer ed., Blackwell 2000). 
7  See Christian Iaione, The Tragedy of Urban Roads: Saving Cities from Choking, Calling on 
Citizens to Combat Climate Change, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 889, 894-96 (2010); Jonathan Remy Nash, 
Economic Efficiency Versus Public Choice: The Case of Property Rights in Road Traffic Management, 49 
B.C.L.  REV. 673, 684-94 (2007); Schuitema, supra note 6, at 84-92.  See also Govinda R. Timilsina & 
Hari B. Dulal, Urban Road Transportation Externalities: Costs and Choice of Policy Instruments, 26 THE 
WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 162, 164-66 (2011) (discussing the various external costs of urban 
transportation). 
8  Iaione, supra note 7, at 891; Nash, supra note 7, at 683-87.  For a discussion addressing why 
anticommons is less of a concern for public roads even in a socialist state such as China, see Michael A. 
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 621 (1998) (identifying anticommons as another possible form of inefficient property arrangement 
whereby too many entities have veto power over the resources).  The authority to manage road usage is 
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approaches have been touted as appropriate solutions to these problems.  
These approaches are price-based instruments (such as congestion pricing) 
and quantity-based instruments (such as license quotas on vehicle ownership 
or usage.)9 
This article’s comparative analysis of congestion management policies 
in the United States, China, and Singapore reveals an interesting paradox.  
Market-based mechanisms are more widely adopted in Singapore than in the 
United States.  Singapore is often the pioneering jurisdiction in 
implementing market-based regulatory solutions such as price-based 
instruments and quantity-based instruments. 10   This is somewhat ironic, 
given the United States’ perceived cultural and ideological affinity for 
market and property rights, which theoretically enables greater and faster 
implementation of market-based regulatory solutions.11  More intriguingly, 
Singapore’s adoption of market-based mechanisms has a distinctive socialist 
flair.  A key justification that resonates in the Singapore policy-making 
process is that the government has a responsibility to collect fair value for 
regulatory permits or public resources allocated to private entities.12  This 
seeming obsession with preventing the squandering of public resources by 
transferring them to private entities is common in a socialist regime such as 
China, where public property has been elevated to near-sacred status.13  That 
said, the market mechanisms championed in Singapore under the banner of 
public property protection are conspicuously absent in China’s traffic 
congestion policies.14 
                                                                                                                                                              
distributed relatively coherently among the government entities, with local government having the 
autonomy to regulate roads within its jurisdiction and the central government retaining an overriding veto 
via the legislation of national.  See Daolu Anquan fa (道路安全法) [Road Safety Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2003, effective May 1, 2004) , art. 4 & 5 (China).     
9  See infra Part II. 
10  See infra Part III. 
11  Katina Miriam Wyman, Why Regulators Turn to Tradeable Permits: A Canadian Case Study, 52 
U. TORONTO L.J. 419, 420-21 & n.6 (2002); see also Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the 
Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 534-38 (2007) (noting with skepticism the 
United States’ unquestioning preference for market solutions). 
12  See, e.g., Certificate of Entitlement, 63 HANSARD (Sing.) Col. 727, Col. 730 (Minister for 
Communications, Mah Bow Tan) (1994) (“It is the Government’s responsibility to collect the market price 
for the [vehicle license quota] and to use the substantial revenue so collected for public projects which can 
benefit everyone.”); infra Part III.C. 
13  See XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 12 (2004) (China) (“Socialist public property is inviolable.  The 
state protects socialist public property.  Appropriation or damaging of state or collective property by any 
organization or individual by whatever means in prohibited.”); Mo Zhang, From Public to Private: The 
Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the Protection of Property Rights in China, 5 BERKELEY BUS. 
L.J. 317, 325-28 (2008) (discussing the concept of socialism and the role of public property); infra Part 
III.B.1. 
14  See infra Part III.B. 
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This article utilizes perceptions of public property to explain the 
above paradox.  Regulatory permits are not typically conceived of as 
property in Chinese jurisprudence.  Therefore, the market-based allocation 
of regulatory permits—such as using vehicle license quotas to control 
congestion—is subject to strong criticism by Chinese academics and 
government officials.  The criticism remains regardless of the substantial 
economic value conferred on the recipients of these regulatory permits, 
which includes the ability of the recipients to “sell” these ostensibly non-
transferable permits via creative legal instruments.15  By contrast, regulatory 
permits are recognized as property under Reich’s “new property” in the 
United States.16  Although U.S. courts have recognized regulatory permits as 
property, 17  these permits are not sufficiently valued when compared to 
conventional public property, such as government contracts and the ability to 
obtain land.18 
In addition, under the current conceptualization of public property in 
the United States, a defining characteristic is the right of public access.  This 
right unduly fuses the issue of ownership with the choice of allocation 
mechanism.  Notwithstanding the fact that public roads have been the poster 
child of accessible public property since Roman times,19 the high demand for 
roads and the substantial negative externalities that road usage imposes20 has 
been an ill-suited allocation mechanism for public roads.  Congestion 
charges, although widely regarded as a better allocation of scarce road space, 
remain fraught with opposition.  Many feel that the public has an “inherent 
right” to access roads, and imposing monetary charges harms the use of 
public roads.21 
By using a comparative analysis of public property, this article 
advances a refined framework of public property to offer greater conceptual 
clarity on the following issues.  For one, the definition of “property” in 
public property must be sufficiently broadened to include regulatory permits 
and other regulatory actions that bestow substantial economic value on 
                                                      
15  See infra Part II.C. 
16  See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 778-85 (1963); infra Part IV.C.1. 
17  See, e.g., Michael L. Wells & Alice E. Snedeker, State-Created Property and Due Process of 
Law: Filling the Void Left by Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 44 GA. L. REV. 161, 172-77 
(2009) (summarizing various U.S. court cases addressing state-created property); Amnon Lehavi, Mixing 
Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 137, 156-58 (2008) (discussing the adjustment of the property regime to 
maintain an individual’s “legitimate claim of entitlement”).  
18  Infra Part IV.C.2. 
19  Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators, supra note 2, at 96-97. 
20  Public access should be distinguished from public free access.  The frequent conflating of the two 
by commentators exacerbates the problems caused by treating public access as a defining characteristic of 
public property.  See infra Parts IV.C.3, V.A.2.  
21  Infra Part V.A.2. 
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recipients.  Important considerations, such as efficiency and loss of public 
revenue, are implicated by allocating both “regulatory property” and 
conventional public properties, such as land use and government contract.   
Further, the concept of “public” in public property should not 
necessarily require public access.  Public access is merely a form of 
allocating property.  It may have been historically the most efficient 
allocation mechanism, but this tradition should not impede society from 
adopting other allocation mechanisms, particularly in light of changes in 
road use patterns due to technological advancement and socio-economic 
changes. 
Part II of this article presents the theoretical literature on traffic 
congestion management and the policies implemented in the United States, 
China, and Singapore.  Part III identifies Singapore’s greater use of market-
based mechanisms, which has a socialist emphasis on public property 
protection.  Thereafter, the article compares the concepts of public property 
in the three jurisdictions.  Part IV proposes a refined framework of public 
property by drawing on the strengths and weaknesses of the different 
concepts of public property in the three jurisdictions.  Part IV also addresses 
possible objections related to redistribution considerations and perverse 
government incentives to generate revenue.  Part V advances a framework of 
public property that involves a broad, economic understanding of property to 
include regulatory permits and a reorientation of public that focuses on 
public ownership and not public access. 
 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF TRAFFIC CONGESTION POLICIES 
 
Traffic congestion is a major problem in the urban areas of the United 
States and around the world. 22   Studies have estimated that the total 
congestion costs in sixty-eight major urban regions in the United States was 
USD 78 billion, or 0.84% of the U.S. GDP, in 1999.23  In addition, the 
continuous rapid increase in transportation demand has aggravated the aging 
and deteriorating transportation infrastructure in United States.24   Traffic 
congestion imposes substantial time and fuel costs to motorists and also 
imposes many other costs that are not borne by motorists, such as other 
                                                      
22  Schuitema, supra note 6, at 85; O’SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 258; Small, supra note 6, at 409-10. 
23  Timilsina & Dulal, supra note 7, at 165.  
24  Carlos Sun, The Toll Road Not Taken: Could the One Option Less Used Make a Difference?, 21 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 280, 281-82 (2012). 
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types of congestion and environmental costs.25  Together, along with the 
open-access nature of roads and the virtual impossibility for the vast number 
of commuters to coordinate their road usage through negotiation, these 
negative externalities render traffic congestion a classic example of the 
“tragedy of the commons.”26  With little incentive to take into account the 
social costs they impose, individual motorists overuse the roads for their 
own benefit at the expense of society.27  
It is usually not controversial to have the government recognize that 
some form of intervention is required to remedy the problem of traffic 
congestion.  However, there is little consensus on the appropriate regulatory 
response.  Regulatory responses can be broadly classified into command-
and-control regulations and market-based mechanisms.28   Command-and-
control regulations are relatively rare in the realm of traffic congestion 
policies and include parking controls; employer-based mandatory trip 
reduction programs; and “odds and evens” license plate vehicle 
authorization systems, where only vehicle owners whose numbered plates 
are odd may use the roads on odd days of the week.29  Due to the prevailing 
consensus that command-and-control regulations are inefficient, these 
practices have not been emphasized in discussions on viable policy 
alternatives. 30   That said, they are still occasionally relied on in other 
jurisdictions as a last-ditch measure to curb traffic usage during sudden 
spikes in road-usage demand.31 
Market-based mechanisms can be divided into schemes based on price 
or quantity.32  Congestion pricing—typically a toll that is levied on vehicle 
travel during peak hours—is often touted as a market-based policy response 
                                                      
25  See e.g., Iaione, supra note 7, at 894-96; Nash, supra note 7, at 684-94; Schuitema, supra note 6, 
at 84-92; see Timilsina & Dulal, supra note 7, at 164-66 (discussing the various external costs of urban 
transportation). 
26  Iaione, supra note 7, at 891; Nash, supra note 7, at 683-90.  Tragedy of the commons refers to the 
overexploitation of communally shared resources by individuals seeking to maximize their own profit in 
the use of resources while disregarding the social costs of their actions, including the long-term benefit to 
the community arising from the preservation of resources.  See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of 
the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
27  Iaione, supra note 7, at 891; O’SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 260-62; Small, supra note 6, at 410-11. 
28  Iaione, supra note 7, at 905-06; Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 275, 275-78 (2000). 
29  Timothy D. Hau, Instruments for Charging Congestion Externalities, in ROAD PRICING: THEORY, 
EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT AND POLICY 223, at 223-24 (Börje Johansson & Lars-Göran Mattsson eds., 1995). 
30  See Iaione, supra note 7, at 905-06; Nash, supra note 7, at 708. 
31  See Beijing cheliang jinqi an weihao xianxing [Beijing Vehicle Usage Restricted by Last Number 
of Vehicle Plate From Today], LIANHE ZAOBAO (Sing.), Oct. 11, 2008 (describing the restrictions of 
vehicles usage in Beijing). 
32  Iaione, supra note 7, at 906-11; Merrill, supra note 28, at 276. 
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to congestion that relies on price incentives.33  By assigning a price that 
theoretically internalizes the externalities of road usage, it is left to 
prospective road users to decide whether or not to pay the toll and use the 
roads.34  Economists widely regard congestion pricing as an effective way to 
achieve social efficiency because it forces motorists to internalize the 
external costs.35  It is also justified philosophically based on the benefit 
principle of taxation, where “consumers of government services should be 
taxed in proportion to the benefit they receive.”36 
Conversely, quantity-based instruments set limits on the usage of 
roads. 37   Such instruments include issuing limited numbers of vehicle 
ownership licenses and limited numbers of entry permits in urban centers.38  
Quantity-based instruments incorporate market mechanisms when the 
permits are allocated to the highest valuers in the market, such as by 
allowing allocated permits to be subsequently transferred.  Professor 
Christian Iaione argued in favor of quantity control over price mechanisms 
because under the former method the optimal usage of a given road could be 
better ascertained, as opposed to the latter method which requires, for 
example, the determination of marginal congestion cost of one additional 
vehicle.39  
 
III. TRAFFIC CONGESTION POLICIES COMPARED 
 
This part presents the theoretical literature on traffic congestion 
management and the different policies implemented in the United States, 
China, and Singapore. 
 
                                                      
33  See Iaione, supra note 7, at 907; Nash, supra note 7, at 704-05; O’SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 262-
66; Small, supra note 6, at 409-10. 
34  See Nash, supra note 7, at 706-09; O’SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 262-64. 
35  See Sun, supra note 24, at 283; Timilsina & Dulal, supra note 7, at 168-69; Nash, supra note 7, at 
704-715; Schuitema, supra note 6, at 93-96; Sock-Yong Phang & Rex S. Toh, Road Congestion Pricing in 
Singapore: 1975 to 2003, 43(2) TRANSP. J. 16, 17 (2004).  For a comparison of congestion pricing with 
other price-based mechanisms such as gasoline tax, parking tax, and subsidies for public transits, see 
O’SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 262-73 (noting how these measures are insufficiently sensitive to the problem 
of excessive travel during peak hours).  See also Michael E. Levine, Airport Congestion: When Theory 
Meets Reality, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 37, 41-44 (2009) (discussing the efficiency of congestion charges in the 
context of airport congestion). 
36  Sun, supra note 24, at 283. 
37  See Iaione, supra note 7, at 906-07. 
38  See id. at 929-37. 
39  Id. at 908-10.  
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A. The United States’ Flirtation with Market-Based Instruments 
 
Despite academic advocacy, the United States has not implemented 
the above market-based approaches to traffic congestion.  There are 
currently no quantity-based instruments in the United States.  In terms of 
price instruments, only limited routes in New Jersey, California, Texas, and 
Florida feature congestion pricing through the use of tolls.40  Texas’s plan 
was a subject of the 2008 study by the U.S. Department of Transportation.41  
Despite the strong commitment and political will of former New York City 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, his repeated attempts to introduce congestion 
pricing to address traffic problems in Manhattan were stalled in the 
legislative process.42  This is both telling and unfortunate because the liberal-
oriented, congestion-plagued, geographically-constrained New York City is 
arguably “the setting in the United States in which congestion pricing would 
face the least opposition.”43 
Such limited implementation is not surprising as “public reaction to 
congestion pricing tends to be strong and negative.”44  One main objection to 
congestion pricing is that it is inherently unfair; the fees impose barriers to 
travel for those with less income.45  Of course, there is also the general 
resistance against paying for an item that was previously free. 46   Other 
objections include privacy concerns, disquiet over the use of market-based 
approaches, and the potential negative effect on local business. 47  
Nonetheless, these objections are not insurmountable.  For example, the 
concerns of equity and new taxes can simply be resolved by providing 
subsidies to the poor or allocating the revenue collected towards public 
transportation or other like benefits.48  Concerns about privacy and utilizing 
a market-based approach can also be tackled through a properly designed 
pricing scheme.49 
                                                      
40  U.S. DEP’T. OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., LIST OF PROJECTS BY TYPE, 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/otps/projectlist.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2013).  Tolls at bridges may 
sometimes incorporate congestion pricing elements by varying the toll charges in accordance to the time of 
travel.  See, e.g., A Year of Growth: One Year of SR 520 Tolling in the Books, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 
26, 2016 (describing the SR 520 Bridge in Seattle).   
41  See Nash, supra note 7, at 678 n.44. 
42  Iaione, supra note 7, at 919-21; Nash, supra note 7, at 735. 
43  Nash, supra note 7, at 734. 
44  Nash, supra note 7, at 726; see Small, supra note 6, at 409. 
45  Sun, supra note 24, at 284; Nash, supra note 7, at 726-27; Schuitema, supra note 6, at 107-09. 
46  Nash, supra note 7, at 728; Schuitema, supra note 6, at 109-10. 
47  Nash, supra note 7, at 728-29; Schuitema, supra note 6, at 110-12.  Parking garages within the 
tolled areas are also affected and are likely to oppose such measures.  See, e.g., Iaione, supra note 7, at 919 
(parking garages joining as plaintiffs in litigations opposing toll measures in New York City). 
48  Schuitema, supra note 6, at 107-09; Nash, supra note 7, at 730; see Iaione, supra note 7, at 911. 
49  See Nash, supra note 7, at 729-30. 
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In practice, the construction of new roads and new lanes is a common 
and popular policy response to traffic congestion, 50  even though this 
response only increases capacity and does not address the issue of efficiency 
and efficacy in traffic congestion.  An increase in road capacity merely 
ameliorates congestion temporarily without tackling the root problem of 
driving.51  Individual drivers will still fail to take into account the congestion 
externalities imposed by one’s road usage on other road users.  In addition, 
building more roads may simply induce more travel, particularly over time.52  
The popularity of increasing road capacity as a policy response to congestion 
reflects the strong support of powerful interest groups.53   These interest 
groups include the automobile and construction industries, which enjoy the 
benefits of increased demand for road transportation and road construction, 
respectively. 54   Further, property developers, property owners, and local 
businesses along the new roads stand to reap significant benefits from 
increased road accessibility and are thus strong supporters of such projects.55  
The local economy also benefits from increased employment and public 
expenditures, particularly if the funds are from a higher level (e.g., federal 
funding in the United States).56 
 
B. China’s Evolution on Vehicle License Quotas and Congestion Pricing 
 
The rapidly increasing demand for road transportation caused by 
China’s rapid economic growth over the past two decades has rendered 
traffic congestion a persistent problem in major Chinese urban population 
centers.  The headline grabbing stories of traffic congestions in Beijing 
during 2010 57  underscored the endemic congestion problem in Chinese 
                                                      
50  Iaione, supra note 7, at 892; Nash, supra note 7, at 694-95. 
51  Nash, supra note 7, at 695. 
52  Nash, supra note 7, at 694-700; Iaione, supra note 7, at 892; O’SULLIVAN, supra note 6, at 269-70. 
53  Nash, supra note 7, at 701-03; see also Iaione, supra note 7, at 902-03. 
54  See Iaione, supra note 7, at 902-03. 
55  Nash, supra note 7, at 701. 
56  Id. at 701-03.  The distinction between local and central government funding is not an issue in the 
city-state of Singapore.  In China, the Ministry of Transport is the central government agency on 
transportation and a major funding provider for road construction throughout the country.  For a breakdown 
on the central government funding received by the respective provinces, see 
http://www.moc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/tongjigongbao/tongjishuju/gonglushuiyunyewu/gudingzichan_TZWC/ 
(last visited July 15, 2013). 
57  For a discussion on how the already dismal traffic conditions in major Chinese cities are often 
aggravated to a city-wide standstill by external factors such as bad weather (e.g. heavy snow or rainfall) or, 
in this particular instance, an eve of a long weekend where there is increased vehicle traffic both into and 
out of the city, see Guo Chao et al., Zuowan Gaofeng Yongdu Huduan Pobei [Number of Highly Congested 
Road Sections Exceed Hundred Last Night], THE BEIJING NEWS, Sept. 20, 2010, at A10. 
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cities. 58   In addition to ramping up road construction, 59  the Chinese 
municipal governments in several major cities have introduced quotas on 
vehicle licenses to curb the growth in vehicle use.  This section examines the 
different allocation mechanisms adopted by different Chinese cities and 
discusses the resistance to congestion pricing. 
 
1. Allocations of Vehicle License Quotas 
 
Aside from the question of how many vehicle licenses should be 
issued under the quota system, the key issue is how these vehicle licenses 
should be allocated.  This section traces the evolution of the allocation 
mechanisms from market auctions in Shanghai, to random lotteries in 
Beijing and Guiyang, and finally to a hybrid compromise in Guangzhou that 
is part auction and part lottery.   
 
a.  Market auctions in Shanghai 
 
Shanghai, the largest Chinese urban population center, was the first 
city in China to set up a vehicle license quota program in response to 
growing urban congestion.60  The first competitive auction was held in 1994 
to allocate a limited number of vehicle licenses. 61   Prior to 2000, the 
mechanism was a closed auction with reserve prices, such that the bidders 
did not know about other bids until the bidding was over and the bids were 
required to be above the stipulated minimum price. 62   The municipal 
government converted the closed auction to an open auction without reserve 
prices as of 2001. 63   Vehicle licenses for imported cars were initially 
auctioned separately and were usually sold at a price several times higher 
                                                      
58  For a government sponsored survey on traffic conditions in Chinese cities, see Zhongke Yuan 
Gongbu 50 Chengshi Shangban Haoshi Paiming Beijing 52 Genzhong Jushou [The Chinese Academy of 
Sciences Announces Ranking on Commuting, Beijing Top the List of 50 Cities with 52 Minutes], WEST 
CHINA METROPOLIS DAILY, Jun. 6, 2010, available at http://news.qq.com/a/20100606/000160.htm.  
59  E.g., GUANGZHOU PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION, JIJI GOUJIAN YITI HUA LITI JIAOTONG 
WANG LOU DAZAO XIANDAI HUA QUNIU XING JIAOTONG JICHU SHESHI TIXI [PROACTIVELY SET UP A UNIFIED 
3D TRANSPORTATION NETWORK TO CONSTRUCT A MODERN TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE HUB SYSTEM] 
(February 20, 2012) http://www.gdcsgj.com/ReadArt.asp?ArtID=1027 (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).  
60  See Luo Wei & Wang Jintao, Chepai Paimai de Lilun Yanjiu yu Shizheng Fenxi [Theoretical 
Research and Empirical Analysis of Vehicle License Auction], 9(6) SCI. TECH. & ENGINEERING (CHINA) 
1466 (2009).  
61  Id.  
62  See Hu Xiyin, Shanghai: 4 Wanyuan Yikuai Chepai neng Jiejue Wenti ma? [Theoretical Research 
and Empirical Analysis of Vehicle License Auction], 2004(3) CHINA SOC’Y PERIODICAL 51 (2004).  
63  See Yang Xiaojun & Huang Quan, Shanghai Jidong Chepai Paimai Xinwei de hefa xing Renshi 
[Recognizing the Legality of Motor Vehicle License Auction: Interpreting Article 12 & 15 of the 
Administrative Permit Law], 2005(4) ADMIN, L. RES. (CHINA) 109 (2005). 
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than those for local cars.  The auctions for the vehicle licenses for imported 
and local cars was merged in 2003.64  To reduce speculation, the auction 
mechanisms were tweaked slightly in 2008 to allow bid adjustments before 
the close of bidding.65  The high demand for cars has pushed the auction 
price to record highs, hitting RMB 80,000 in 2013 (approximately 
USD 13,000, which is more than the price of some new cars).66   
The Shanghai vehicle license quota program is generally effective. 
While traffic congestion persists in Shanghai on weekends and public 
holidays, the congestion level is generally regarded by Chinese 
commentators as significantly better in Shanghai than Beijing, the Chinese 
capital and second largest urban population center in China.67  The proceeds 
from the auction have also helped subsidize important public transportation 
initiatives, such as rebates for public transportation transfers, free public 
transportation for the elderly, and subsidies for remote public transportation 
routes.68 
The neighboring municipality of Wenzhou implemented a similar 
vehicle license quota and auction system in 1997, but abolished it in 2007.69  
This was not surprising because the auction allocation mechanism was 
continuously subject to criticism.  In particular, a high level official from the 
Ministry of Commerce caused a furor in 2004 by publicly criticizing the 
Shanghai measures for imposing a monetary payment for vehicle registration 
that exceeded the requirements set forth in the Road Traffic Safety Law.70  
There were also concerns by academics that the substantial revenue 
                                                      
64  See Yue Haiyin & Fan Junfen, Shanghai shi Siche Paizhao Paimai de Xingzheng Faxue Sikao 
[Reflection of Shanghai Municipal Vehicle Auction from the Administrative Law Perspective], 7(6) J. 
NINGXIA COMMUNIST PARTY INST. 95 (2005). 
65  See “Chepai” Paimai: Shanghai Zhidu Wangpai [“Vehicle Licenses” Auction: Trump Card of 
Shanghai’s Management of Traffic Congestion], SOUTHERN WEEKEND (CHINA), Apr. 9, 2012, available at 
http://news.66wz.com/system/2012/04/09/103111759.shtml (last visited July 30, 2012). 
66  See Shanghai siche Paijie Suoci ‘poba’(上海私车牌价 首次“破八”) [Shanghai Private Vehicle 
License Price Exceed Eighty Thousand for the First Time], LIANHE ZAOBAO (Sing.), Feb. 24, 2013; Ai Xin, 
Sijia che Xianpai Xiangou hequ Hecong [What Next for Restrictions in Vehicle License], WATER 
TRANSPORT J. (CHINA), Sep. 21, 2012; Zhou An, Guangzhou: “yaohao + paipei” nengfou cheng zhidu 
liangfang [Guangzhou: Can “Lottery + Auction” be Ideal Solution for Congestion?], TRAFFIC WKLY OF 
PUB. SECURITY DAILY (CHINA), July 17, 2012, at 4. 
67  Ai Xin, supra note 66. 
68  Qiche Xiangou Fengbao Jiangzhi [Storm of Vehicle Purchase Restriction is Imminent], ECON. & 
NATION WKLY (CHINA), Aug. 20, 2012. 
69  Zhang Haipeng, Minge Weiyuan tian Zhongjie Wenzhou Shiche Haopai Paimai Zhidu [Proposal 
by Revolutionary Committee Member Led to Termination of Wenzhou Vehicle Auction System], Oct. 6, 
2008, available at http://www.minge.gov.cn/txt/2008-10/06/content_2502424.htm (critiquing the 
ineffectiveness of auction mechanisms given the lack of travel restrictions on non-Wenzhou registered 
vehicles in addition to the hefty price of the measure).  
70  “Vehicle Licenses” Auction: Trump Card of Shanghai’s Management of Traffic Congestion, supra 
note 65. 
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available under such regulatory schemes would distract the government from 
genuine public welfare considerations. 71 
The opposition to the Shanghai vehicle license quota program has 
cumulated into legal actions.  In 2011, litigation challenging the lack of any 
publicized legal basis for the auction was decided in favor of the government 
on the basis that the government’s general reference to the Road Traffic 
Safety Law and Auction Law was a sufficient legal basis for the vehicle 
license auction.72  Around the same time, Chinese activist lawyers lodged a 
complaint with the Shanghai Development and Reform Commission, 
alleging that the auction was an illegal administrative monopoly, but this 
complaint was dismissed.73  While the Shanghai municipal government has 
remained steadfast in the implementation of the auction, it has begun to 
proclaim—in an attempt to deflect criticisms—that the auction is only a 
temporary measure that will be phased out upon the improvement of overall 
traffic conditions.74 
 
b. “Fair” lottery in Beijing and Guiyang 
 
When it was Beijing’s turn to implement a vehicle license quota in 
2011, the controversial auction mechanism was shunned.  The Temporary 
Regulations on the Control of the Number of Small Vehicles was enacted to 
set up a vehicle license quota scheme.75  Instead of using auctions, these 
vehicle licenses were allocated in lotteries, where the winner received the 
license for free.76  The vehicle license is non-transferable and void if not 
exercised within six months.77   To ensure fairness and transparency, the 
                                                      
71  Peng Xingting, Shanghai Cepai Paimai Zhidu “Bianxing ji” [Evolution of Shanghai Vehicle 
License Auction Regime], DECISION-MAKING (CHINA), Apr. 2008, at 57.  
72  Hu Lvyin, Shanghai shi Zengfu Cheliang Paizhao Paimai yiju de fali Fenxi [Analysis on the Legal 
Basis of Shanghai Municipal Government Vehicle License Auction], 2011(5) LEGAL SCI. MONTHLY 
(CHINA) 3, 3 (2011). 
73  Wen Jie, Shanghai Fagai wei Huiying fan Longduan Jubao: Chepai Paimai bu Weifa [Shanghai 
Development and Reform Commission Respond to Complaint of Monopoly: Vehicle License Auction is not 
Illegal], LEGAL DAILY (CHINA), Apr. 28, 2011, available at http://biz.cn.yahoo.com/ypen/ 
20110428/333854.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
74   “Vehicle Licenses” Auction: Trump Card of Shanghai’s Management of Traffic Congestion, supra 
note 65. 
75  Xiao Keche Shuliang Tiaokong Zanxing Guiding (北京市小客车数量调控暂行规定 ) 
[Temporary Regulations on the Control of the Number of Small Vehicle] (promulgated by Beijing City 
Government, Dec. 23, 2010, effective Dec. 23, 2010) (China).  The vehicle licenses issued every month are 
limited to 20,000.  See Liu Zeling & Liu Zhenni, Shoulun Gouche Yaohao 5 miao Yaochu 1.76 wan zhibiao 
[First Round of Vehicle License Lottery Produce 17600 Allocation], THE BEIJING NEWS (CHINA), Jan. 27, 
2011, at A07.  
76  Art. 3, Temporary Regulations on the Control of the Number of Small Vehicle, supra note 75. 
77  Id. at art. 6. 
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process of the lottery is conducted by high-level government officials and  
subject to stringent supervision by notaries and the Ministry of 
Supervision. 78   More than 180,000 individuals who met the residency 
requirement participated in the first lottery, with a success ratio of 10.6:1.79  
Many of those who won did not register a vehicle, and only 35 vehicles were 
registered on the first day.80  This suggests that most participants of the 
lottery were not in need of a vehicle.81  The odds were further reduced in 
subsequent lotteries, reaching a mere ratio of 47:1 in 2012 with participation 
driven not by a genuine need for vehicles, but simply the hope of winning a 
prize in a lottery.82  This mismatch between actual vehicle users and lottery 
winners of vehicle licenses has led to many under-the-table transactions in 
the grey market for vehicle licenses, such as the long-term “rental” of a 
vehicle at a huge fee from a lottery winner.83 
A similar vehicle license quota scheme was implemented in Guiyang 
in 2011.  The actual measure differs slightly from that of Beijing.  Two types 
of vehicle licenses are issued under the new scheme.  The first type of 
license entitles the vehicle to enter into the inner city area, but the licenses 
are restricted in number and allocated by lottery without any charge.84  The 
second type of license has no restrictions in quantity but is not permitted to 
enter the inner city area.85  Another difference under the Guiyang scheme is 
the more relaxed residency requirement, which does not require the license 
holder to have continuously paid five years of income tax and social security 
contributions to the city.86  The initial lottery of 1,800 vehicle licenses (down 
                                                      
78  Liu Zeling & Liu Zhenni, supra note 75. 
79  Id.  The success ratio of the Shanghai auction is only 2.8:1 even during periods of high 
participation level.  See Shanghai Siche Paijie Suoci ‘poba’上海私车牌价 首次“破八” [Shanghai 
Private Vehicle License Price Exceed Eighty Thousand for the First Time], LIANHE ZAOBAO 联合早报, 
Feb. 24, 2013. 
80  Liu Zeling, Beijing Yaohao Shangpai Shouri Changmian Lenqing qin 35 Liangche Dengji [Poor 
Response on First Day of Registration for Beijing Vehicle License Lottery: Only 35 Vehicle Registrations], 
THE BEIJING NEWS (CHINA), Jan. 31, 2011, at A05; see also Zhou An, supra note 66, at 11. 
81  Liu Zeling, supra note 80.  
82  Ai Xin, supra note 66; Zhou An, supra note 64. 
83  Ai Xin, supra note 66; see also Storm of Vehicle Purchase Restriction is Imminent, supra note 68; 
Zhou An, supra note 66.  Under this form of circumvention, persons who need to travel with cars but failed 
to win the lottery can sign a long-term vehicle rental contract with lottery winners.  Ai Xin, supra note 66.  
The latter party will buy and register a car of the “renter’s” choice, and allow the “renter” to use the vehicle 
exclusively throughout the term of the contract, which can be several years.  Id.  In return, the “renter” will 
pay the lottery winner the cost of the vehicle in addition to a premium that is essentially the value of the 
vehicle license.  Id.   
84  Shen Liqiong, Guiyang fabu “Xianche ling” [Guiyang Announces Vehicles Restrictions], 
GUIZHOU CITY NEWS, July 11, 2011, available at http://gzdsb.gog.com.cn/system/ 
2011/07/12/011137503.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
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from a prior monthly average of 4,000) produced a total of 17,258 
applications.87  Car buyers often have family members, relatives, and friends 
participate in the lottery because each person only has one chance. 88  
Statistics suggest that the program was successful one year into its 
implementation, with the annual increase in vehicles reduced by half and 
average traffic speed in the inner city improved by 28%.89 
The free lottery mechanism and purported temporary nature of the 
restrictions of the Guiyang measure dampened opposition, although 
concerns were expressed about the vehicle license quota scheme being a de 
facto restriction on vehicle sales which would violate government policies 
for the automobile industry and general economic development. 90   In 
particular, the Development and Reform Commission has publicly opined 
that the Guiyang measures are contrary to the country’s economic 
development plan for the automobile industry.91 
 
c. Hybrid compromise in Guangzhou 
 
In 2012, Guangzhou, China’s third largest city, became the latest city 
to implement a vehicle license quota program.92  Framed as a temporary 
measure with a trial period of one year, vehicle licenses were capped at ten 
thousand new vehicles every month. 93   The quota of vehicle licenses 
represents a reduction of approximately 47 percent of the average monthly 
vehicle growth from the previous year.94  Learning from the pitfalls of high 
priced (and allegedly unfair) auctions in Shanghai and from the 
inefficiencies of a pure lottery, Guangzhou adopted a hybrid allocation 
mechanism.  Vehicle licenses are primarily allocated in two different ways: 
half through a free lottery and half through an auction with a reserve price of 
                                                      
87  Dingzhe yali Zoushang Xianche Zhilu Guiyang Shoupi Yaochu 1800 ge Xinyun zhe [Adopting 
Vehicle Restriction Under Pressure – Guiyang Select 1800 Lucky Persons via Lottery], CHINA 
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Sept. 5, 2011. 
88  Id.  One interviewee stated that he had amassed 11 applications through his friends and relatives, 
all of which failed.  Id.   
89  See Zhou An, supra note 66. 
90  Shen Liqiong, “Xianche ling”bingbu weifan goujia zhengche [Vehicles Restrictions Does not 
Violate Government Policies], GUIZHOU CITY DAILY, July 11, 2011, available at 
http://gzdsb.gog.com.cn/system/2011/07/21/011146891.shtml (last visited July 30, 2012). 
91  Fagai wei Shouci Manqué Biaotie Guiyang Qiche Xiangou ling Weifan Zhengce [Development 
and Reform Commission for the First Time Explicitly States that Guiyang’s Vehicle Purchase Restriction is 
Contrary to Policy], ZHONGGUO QICHE GONGYE XINXI, July 20, 2011. 
92  See Zhou An, supra note 66; Zeng Shi, Meiyue Xiangou Yiwan Liang Guangzhou Turan Shishi 
Qiche Xiangou lin [Guangzhou Suddenly Implement Vehicle Purchase Restrictions of Monthly Quota of 
10,000 Vehicles], LIANHE ZAOBAO (SING.), Jul. 2, 2012. 
93  Zhou An, supra note 66; Zeng Shi, supra note 92. 
94  Zeng Shi, supra note 92. 
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RMB 10,000.  A small number of vehicle licenses are specifically carved out 
for environmentally friendly green vehicles and are allocated via a free 
lottery.95  Proceeds of the auction are dedicated to public transportation.96 
The initial rounds of allocation produced limited participation that 
saw fewer bids in the auction than available licenses.97  The main reason for 
the apparent lack of interest is that the vehicle license quota program was not 
matched by travel restrictions for vehicles not registered in Guangzhou, 
unlike other Chinese municipal vehicle license quota schemes.98  Vehicle 
owners could register their vehicles in neighboring counties and avoid the 
fees and hassles of the Guangzhou scheme.99 
 
2. General Resistance to Congestion Fees 
 
Congestion pricing, the other prominent tool for tackling urban 
congestion, has been proposed in Chinese urban centers such as 
Guangzhou 100  and Shenzhen. 101   Congestion charges have also been 
considered in cities such as Beijing, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Chengdu, and 
Chongqing.102 
Nonetheless, these measures face strong resistance in implementation.  
Objections come in many forms.  One important reservation is in regard to 
the legality and administrative implementation of congestion fees, 
particularly when vehicle ownership and usage is subject to a myriad of 
                                                      
95  Guangzhou: xia Yilun Chepai Zhengduo Xingshi heru? [Guangzhou: How is the Next Round of 
Vehicle License Auction Shaping Up?], CHINA NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 3, 2012; Zhou An, supra note 66. 
96  Zhou An, supra note 66. 
97  Guangzhou Jingpai Junjia Jiangjin Wanyuan Xianxing xize Xiangwei Chutai [Guangzhou Auction 
Average Price Nearing Ten Thousand Dollars: Detailed Measures on Travel Restriction Remains Absence], 
CHINA NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 27, 2012; Guangzhou: How is the Next Round of Vehicle License Auction 
Shaping Up?, supra note 95, at 15. 
98  Guangzhou Auction Average Price Nearing Ten Thousand Dollars: Detailed Measures on Travel 
Restriction Remains Absence, supra note 97; Guangzhou: How is the Next Round of Vehicle License 
Auction Shaping Up?, supra note 95. 
99  Guangzhou Auction Average Price Nearing Ten Thousand Dollars: Detailed Measures on Travel 
Restriction Remains Absence, supra note 97. 
100  Guangzhou Zhidu Fangan Taolun gao Chulu ni Yanjiu shou Jiaotong Yongdu fei [Guangzhou 
Congestion Relief Plan Discussion Draft Released: Studies on Traffic Congestion Charges Planned], 
CHINA NEWS NET, Jan. 10, 2011, http://auto.ifeng.com/roll/20110110/508434.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 
2012). 
101  Guo Yao & Cao Jing, Shenzheng shi Zhengshi Biaotia nin Shouqu Jiaotong Yongdu fei 
[Shengzhen Officially Announcement Plans to Impose Congestion Charges], YANGCHENG EVENING NEWS, 
Mar. 8, 2012, http://auto.qq.com/a/20120308/000061.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
102  Difang Lianghui riyi Jiaotong Yongdu fei Cheshi Huozai yu Likong [Vigorous Discussion on 
Traffic Congestion Charges in Local Legislature Meetings: Possible Negative Profit Impact on Automobile 
Industry], DAILY ECONOMIC NEWS, Feb. 10, 2012, available at http://auto.qq.com/a/20120210/000166.htm 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
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taxes and charges. 103   The lack of complementary public transportation 
infrastructure and effective traffic management also raise doubts about the 
efficacy of congestion charges in actually reducing congestion.104  There is 
the inevitable public skepticism about the inequitable and regressive nature 
of the charges (favoring the rich and the public authorities) and general 
unhappiness about rising costs of living. 105   In addition, there are real 
concerns about possible negative effects on the Chinese automobile 
industry.106  This is not surprising given the important economic role of the 
Chinese automobile industry as a driver for the manufacturing sector and 
consumer consumption.  Notably, Beijing decided to forego imposing 
congestion charges in part to negatively affecting the automobile industry, 
which was still feeling the effects of Beijing’s earlier restrictions on vehicle 
licenses.107 
 
D. Singapore’s Epitomization of Market-based Solutions 
 
With five million people packed into a land area of 442 square 
miles,108 urban congestion is a persistent concern for the densely populated 
island state of Singapore.  In sharp contrast to the United States and China, 
both price-based and quantity-based market instruments feature prominently 
in Singapore’s regulatory responses to traffic congestion.  This section 
                                                      
103  Ma Lianhua, Zhengshou Jiatong Yongdu fei re Zengyi Beizhi “qi Zhong zui” [Controversies 
Surrounding Imposition of Congestion Charges: Seven Sins], CHINA YOUTH DAILY, Feb. 16, 2012, 
available at http://auto.qq.com/a/20120216/000227.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).  This argument relies 
on Article 63 of Qiche Chanye Fazhan Zhengce 汽车产业发展政策 [Development Policy for Automobile 
Industry] (promulgated by National Development and Reform Commission, May. 21, 2004, effective May 
21, 2004) (China) that requires at minimum the approval of the State Council (the executive branch of the 
central government) before any fees on road utilization can be imposed.   
104  Lin Junhui et al., Daibiao Huiyuan Jibian Yongdu fei Jinglu da Dushi huo Chizao bude Bushuo(代
表委员激辩拥堵费 京沪大都市或迟早不得不收) [Vigorous Debate on Congestion Charges Among 
Representatives: Perhaps an  Inevitable Eventualities in Big Urban Cities like Beijing and Shanghai], 
GUANGZHOU DAILY, Mar. 12, 2012, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012lh/2012-
03/12/c_122820630.htm (last visited July 30, 2012); Ma Lianhua, supra note 103.  Otherwise known in 
economic literature as “inelasticity of demand,” the argument posits that the demand for vehicle travel will 
remain high even with congestion charges because there are no practical alternatives in the form of public 
transport.  Lin Junhui et al., supra.   
105  Lin Junhui et al., supra note 104; Ma Lianhua, supra note 103. 
106  Ma Lianhua, supra note 103.  Congestion charges arguably decrease the attractiveness of car 
travel and consequently reduces the domestic demand for automobiles.   
107  Sun Gan, Beijing Lianghui: Beijing shi Zhanbu Zhengshou Yongdu fei [Beijing Legislative 
Meeting: No Congestion Charges for the Moment], JINGHUA TIMES, Jan. 17, 2011, available at 
http://auto.ifeng.com/news/special/yongdufei/20110117/515380.shtml (last visited July 30, 2012). 
108  SINGAPORE DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, CENSUS OF POPULATION 2010 STATISTICAL RELEASE 3: 
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSPORT 3 (2011). 
JANUARY 2014 A COMPARATIVE PUBLIC PROPERTY STORY OF SINGAPORE 17 
 
examines Singapore’s twin policies of market-based vehicle license quotas 
and congestion pricing. 
 
1. Certificate of Entitlement: Auctioning of Vehicle Ownership Licenses 
 
The Certificate of Entitlement (“COE”) is a vehicle quota system that 
has been in effect since 1990 as a means to control traffic congestion.109  It is 
a competitive tender system in which potential vehicle owners bid for a 
limited number of car-ownership licenses. 110   Bidding is conducted 
electronically by sealed tender with licenses sold at the price of the lowest 
successful tender price.111  The strong demand for vehicles and the limited 
numbers of licenses have resulted in high prices that often exceed the cost of 
new cars.112  The mechanism was tweaked several times in response to the 
exploitation of loopholes by car dealers and potential car owners.  For 
example, because the licenses were initially transferable and could be 
applied to any vehicle, speculation in the licenses and a corresponding rise in 
prices resulted and eventually led to transfer restrictions. 113   A cheaper 
vehicle license that was meant for use on the weekends and could only 
operate on weekdays with the purchase of coupons was revamped after 
luxury cars owners realized that the savings from the cheaper vehicle license 
more than made up for the additional costs of daily coupons. 114  
Notwithstanding these loopholes, Singapore’s use of a quantity-based market 
mechanism was considered successful in curbing vehicle growth in Christian 
Iaione’s comparative case studies.115  Indeed, the rationale of the Singapore 
                                                      
109  Rex S. Toh & Sock-Yong Phang, Curbing Urban Traffic Congestion in Singapore: A 
Comprehensive Review, 37(2) TRANSPORTATION J. 24, 28-29 (1997); see Certificate of Entitlement, supra 
note 12, at cols. 728-29 (Mah Bow Tan). 
110  Certificate of Entitlement, supra note 12, at col. 729 (Mah Bow Tan). 
111  Rex S. Toh & Sock-Yong Phang, supra note 109, at 28.  As a simple illustration, say there are two 
COEs to be issued, and there are three bids submitted at the amount of one, two, and three dollars, 
respectively.  Under the Singapore auction rules, the bids of two dollars and three dollars are successful 
bids, and both successful bidders will each pay two dollars for their COE.  This differs from the current 
Shanghai auction, where the two successful bidders will pay two dollars and three dollars, respectively. 
112  Iaione, supra note 7, at 930; Rex S. Toh & Sock-Yong Phang, supra note 109, at 26-27 (providing 
a detailed breakdown of car prices). 
113  Iaione, supra note 7, at 931; Rex S. Toh & Sock-Yong Phang, supra note 109, at 28-29.  The 
transferability restriction mandates the successful bidder of the COE to register a vehicle in one’s own 
name within six months to avoid forfeiting the COEs.  See  ONE MOTORING, 
http://www.onemotoring.com.sg/publish/onemotoring/en/lta_information_guidelines/buy___sell_a_used/O
wnership_Transfer/transfer_fee_computation.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).  The registration of the 
vehicle that the COE is applied to cannot be transferred within three months of registration and can only be 
transferred between the 4th and 6th month upon payment of any increase in COEs’ value between the time 
of COE bidding and the time of transfer.  Id.   
114  See Sock-Yong Phang & Rex S. Toh, supra note 35, at 20-21. 
115  Iaione, supra note 7, at 929-32. 
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government for imposing the quota 116  echoed Christian Iaione’s 
justifications for quantity control over price mechanisms.117 
Interestingly, during Singapore’s legislative debate on the 
implementation of the COEs, queuing and balloting were expressly rejected 
as methods of allocation because of the windfall profit for those who were 
merely quick to line up or just lucky. 118   The Minister in charge of 
transportation noted that “[i]t is the Government’s responsibility to collect 
the market price for the COEs and to use the substantial revenue so collected 
for public projects which can benefit everyone.”119  The Minister also argued 
that the revenue collected helped balance the budget and reduced the need to 
raise taxes.120  Indeed, the Singapore government credited the substantial 
revenue levied on car ownership as an important reason for the lowering of 
income tax rates.121  A legislator also noted that while transportation policies 
relating to car ownership did not affect the majority of the population who 
were not car owners, the policy could still be potentially detrimental to them.  
Failure to recoup the windfall to car owners from government regulatory 
actions would result in less government revenue available for public 
projects.122 
 
2.  Area Licensing Scheme and Electronic Road Pricing: Pioneering 
Congestion Pricing 
 
In 1975, Singapore became the first country in the world to implement 
congestion pricing to manage traffic congestion in its business and finance 
district.123  Under the Area Licensing Scheme, a paper license had to be 
purchased and displayed on the vehicle for entry into the central business 
district during morning peak hours.124  Technology advancement in recent 
times has allowed Singapore to introduce an even more sophisticated 
Electronic Road Pricing system (“ERP”).  The use of electronic card readers 
allows for reliable automatic fee collection every time the vehicle passes 
                                                      
116  Select Committee Report on Land Transportation Policy, 54 HANSARD (Sing.) Col. 934, Col. 936-
937 (1990) (Hong Hai). 
117  Iaione, supra note 7, at 908-10.  
118  See Certificate of Entitlement, supra note 12, at col. 729 (Mah Bow Tan). 
119  Id. at col. 730. 
120  Id. 
121  Select Committee Report on Land Transportation Policy, supra note 116, at col. 953 (Heng 
Chiang Meng). 
122  Id. 
123  See Schuitema, supra note 6, at 100; Sock-Yong Phang & Rex S. Toh, supra note 35, at 17. 
124  Sock-Yong Phang & Rex S. Toh, supra note 35, at 17; see also Rex S. Toh & Sock-Yong Phang, 
supra note 109, at 24-25. 
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under the gantries.125  More importantly, the rates are regularly fine-tuned to 
reflect changes in actual usage (i.e., congestion) of roads.  A targeted speed 
benchmark is set based on the engineering capacities of the roads, and the 
rates are reviewed quarterly in response to the measured speed on those 
roads, with rates decreasing upon higher speed and vice-versa. 126   In 
addition, the rates are adjusted to anticipate changes in traffic flow, such as 
lower rates during school holidays in which peak-hour traffic is lower.127  A 
reduction in taxes related to vehicle ownership (including road taxes and 
motor vehicle registration fees, but not fuel tax) was also introduced in 2004 
to ease possible public objections for the scheme.128 
The Singapore government justified the congestion charges as being 
for the “privilege to drive into the restricted area”129 and as a “better use of 
our limited road space,” 130  particularly in light of the economic and 
environmental costs of congestion.131  The Singapore government in recent 
years has emphasized that congestion pricing is not a revenue-generating 
measure, noting the amount of the total vehicle and road tax reduction 
implemented in conjunction with the congestion pricing is less than the 
projected increase in revenues from congestion pricing.132 
The Singapore congestion pricing regime has generally been 
considered a success by international and American commentators in 
reducing traffic and relieving congestion in the district.133  However, some 
empirical studies indicate that the measures may have gone too far, leading 
to under-utilized roads to the detriment of overall welfare.134  Nonetheless, 
its success “is at least somewhat responsible for the increased attention paid 
to congestion pricing regimes domestically [in the United States].”135 
 
                                                      
125  See Iaione, supra note 7, at 918; Sock-Yong Phang & Rex S. Toh, supra note 35, at 21-22; Rex S. 
Toh & Sock-Yong Phang, supra note 109, at 30-31. 
126  Sock-Yong Phang & Rex S. Toh, supra note 35, at 22. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 23. 
129  Budget, Ministry of Communications, Hansard (Sing.) (Mar. 19, 1975) vol. 34 at col 583 (Yong 
Nyuk Lin, Minister for Communications). 
130 Electronic Road Pricing, Hansard (Sing.) (12 Oct. 1998) vol. 69 at cols 1297-1298 (Mah Bow Tan, 
Minister for Communications). 
131  Electronic Road Pricing (Shift in Use), Hansard (Sing.) (Feb. 15, 2008) vol. 84 at cols 317-321 
(Raymond Lim Siang Keat, Minister for Transport). 
132  Id. at col. 322 (Raymond Lim Siang Keat, Minister for Transport). 
133  Iaione, supra note 7, at 917-18; see Schuitema, supra note 6, at 99-100; Sock-Yong Phang & Rex 
S. Toh, supra note 35, at 24. 
134  Sock-Yong Phang & Rex S. Toh, supra note 35, at 20 (discussing the various empirical studies); 
see Rex S. Toh & Sock-Yong Phang, supra note 109, at 25. 
135  See Nash, supra note 7, at 723. 
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IV. MARKET MECHANISMS THROUGH THE LENS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY 
 
The comparison of traffic congestion policies in the United States, 
China and Singapore reveals a divergence in regulatory approaches.  One 
particular feature that emerges is the stronger commitment to market-based 
mechanisms in Singapore’s regulatory approach compared to the United 
States and China.  This part explains how the differences in traffic 
congestion policies reflect the respective underlying conception of public 
property in the three jurisdictions. 
 
A. Market-based Mechanisms and the Public Property Protection 
Justification  
 
Market-based mechanisms are predominantly featured in the traffic 
congestion policies of Singapore.  Whether in terms of price-based 
instruments or quantity-based instruments, Singapore leads the way. In 
contrast, the utilization of market-based mechanisms remains haphazard in 
China and the United States.  This is somewhat ironic, especially for the 
United States, because the common perception is that the cultural and 
ideological affinity for market and property rights in the United States 
allows for greater and faster implementation of market-based regulatory 
solutions.136 
Of course, the fact that market-based mechanisms enjoy greater actual 
implementation in a non-U.S. jurisdiction is not in itself particularly unusual.  
Chile is often noted as an example in which the free market economic 
thought of the Chicago School enjoys much greater manifestation than in the 
United States. 137   In particular, the Chilean privatization reform of 
pensions 138  echoed the United States’ reform proposal of private social 
security accounts 139  that purportedly reflects the American cultural 
                                                      
136  See, e.g., Wyman, supra note 11, at 420-21 & n.6 (2002); Sinden, supra note 11, at 534-38 (noting 
with skepticism the United States’ unquestioning preference for market solutions). 
137  See Judith Teichman, Merging the Modern and Traditional: Market Reform in Chile and 
Argentina, 37 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 23, 26-30 (2004). 
138  Joseph J. Norton, Privatization of Public Pension Systems in Developing Nations: A Call for 
International Standards, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 817, 841-51 (1998).  Chile’s reform involved switching the 
pension from a defined contribution scheme to a defined benefit scheme with individual account.  Id. In 
essence, the amount an individual would receive during retirement is now directly tied to the individual’s 
contributed amount and the performance of the individual’s investment choice for the contributed amount.  
Id.  For comparative analysis of Chilean pension schemes with that of other countries, see Elizabeth D. 
Tedrow, Social Security Privatization in Other Countries: What Lessons Can be Learned for the United 
States?, 14 ELDER L.J. 35 (2006). 
139  Benjamin A. Templin, Full Funding: The Future of Social Security, 22 J.L. & POL. 395, 395-96 
(2006); Tedrow, supra note 138, at 36-38.  Proposed by President Bush in 2005-2006, the reform proposal 
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imperative of a free market economy.140  The situation of Singapore could be 
similar to the Chilean experience, which resulted from an unorthodox 
alliance of Chile’s authoritarian regime with a close-knit group of 
technocrats.141 
What is interesting is the rationale for adopting a market-based 
mechanism in Singapore over other allocation mechanisms, such as lottery 
or queuing.  Aside from the typical economic efficiency arguments of 
allocating resources to the highest value users and lowering regulatory 
costs,142 an important justification was to collect adequate charges for the 
benefits accruing to private entities.143  A critical justification alluded to in 
the Singapore legislative debate is the concept of vehicle licenses as a public 
resource for which the government has a responsibility to recoup fair 
value.144  The congestion charges were also justified as a charge for the 
“privilege to drive into the restricted area”145 and the “use of our limited 
road space.”146 
In essence, adopting market-based mechanisms appears to be based on 
a key pillar of socialist ideologies: the protection of public property.147  In 
the eyes of the Singapore government, regulatory permits and roads are 
publicly owned property that should only be allocated upon collection of 
appropriate charges from recipients.  Because market-based mechanisms—
whether competitive auctions or prices based on market transactions—are 
the most effective means to ensure that the government collects maximum 
value for these resources, such mechanisms are the preferred allocation 
devices for the Singapore government. 
This insight into the justifications for the market-based mechanisms in 
Singapore raises two interesting points.  First, Singapore’s government is 
adopting market-based mechanisms pursuant to its ideology of public 
property protection rather than an affinity towards free-market or private 
property.  Second, the Singapore approach differs greatly from the policies 
                                                                                                                                                              
evoked an intense political debate and backlash.  Templin, supra.  The proposal is actually quite modest, 
involving only a partial privatization model where workers have the option to set aside four percent of the 
payable payroll taxes into their own private retirement account.  Id.   
140  Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social Security 
Privatization, 41 B.C. L. REV. 975, 980-81 & 1012 (2000); Templin, supra note 139, at 402 (describing a 
free market economy as “a system of personal ownership and personal responsibility”).  
141  Teichman, supra note 137.  
142  See Certificate of Entitlement, supra note 12, at col. 729 (Mah Bow Tan) (“COEs will go to the 
persons who value them most and who are able and willing to pay.”). 
143  See supra Part III.D.1; Budget, Ministry of Communications, supra note 129. 
144  See supra Part III.D.1. 
145  See Budget, Ministry of Communications, supra note 127. 
146  Electronic Road Pricing, supra note 130, at Col. 1297-1298. 
147  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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adopted in China, even though protection of public property is otherwise 
featured prominently in the legal and public discourses in China.  The 
remainder of this part addresses these two matters by critically examining 
the concept of public property in Singapore, China, and the United States. 
 
B. China: Too Little “Property” in “Public Property” 
 
One notable difference between the traffic congestion policies in 
China and Singapore is that while quotas for vehicle licenses are utilized in 
both jurisdictions, market auction as an allocation mechanism is rarer in 
China.  This section explains that while public property is heavily 
emphasized under the ostensibly Chinese Socialist regime, regulatory 
permits are not typically regarded as property that should be allocated to 
private entities only upon receipt of valuable consideration.   
  
1. Emphasis in Public Property Protection Under Chinese Socialist 
Ideology 
 
Protection of public property is of the utmost importance in China.  
China has been under the tight reigns of the Chinese Communist Party since 
1949.148  Notwithstanding a series of social and economic reforms since the 
1980s,149  China’s communist and socialist ideological tradition remains a 
dominant influence in law and policies, particularly in terms of rhetoric.150  
One distinct manifestation of this ideology is its emphasis on protecting 
public property. 151   The Chinese Constitution gave public property 
                                                      
148  See Mo Zhang, supra note 13, at 324-25. 
149  For discussions of the history of Chinese reform especially after 1979, see generally JING 
WEIMING ET AL., JINGJI ZHUANXING ZHONG DE SHICHANG SHEHUI ZHUYI – GUOWAI MAKE SI ZHUYI DE FENXI 
YU SHIJIAN JIANYAN [MARKET SOCIALIST IN THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION: THE ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL 
EXAMINATION FROM FOREIGN MARXIST] 202-06 (2009); ZHONGGUO JINGJI TIZHI GAIGE 30 NIAN HUIGU YU 
ZHANWANG [30 YEARS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA: REFLECTING AND LOOKING AHEAD ] 36-42 (Wei 
liqun ed., 2008).  
150  Wuquan fa (五泉山发) [Property Law] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, 
effective Oct. 1, 2007), art. 3 (China) (“In the primary stage of socialism, the state upholds the basic 
economic system under which the public ownership shall play a dominant role and diversified forms of 
ownership may develop side by side.”).  See also XIANFA [Constitution] Preamble (2004) (China).  For a 
discussion of the ideological evolution of China’s socio-economic model since 1949, see Mo Zhang, supra 
note 13, at 325-37. 
151  Public ownership is essential in socialist economy, though progressive socialist thinkers argue that 
it encompasses more than state ownership.  See, e.g., GE YANG, JINGJI ZHUANXING QI GONGYOU 
CHANQUAN ZHIDU DE YANHUA YU JIESHI [EVOLUTION AND EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC-OWNED PROPERTY 
SYSTEM DURING ECONOMIC TRANSITION] 40-61 (2009); JING WEIMING ET AL., supra note 149, at 38-42.  
After wiping out private economic entities during the period of 1960s and 1970s, private entities were 
gradually allowed since the 1978 market reform.  See 30 YEARS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA: 
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“inviolable” status152 long before it recognized private property in 2004.153  
This is not surprising because a major platform of the Chinese Communist 
party is instituting a socialist state whereby public ownership is the dominant 
form of ownership in the country. 154   Public ownership of property is 
deemed crucial for the survival and prosperity of the infant socialist state.155  
Notwithstanding the transition into a “socialist market economy” and the 
increased recognition of the economic contributions from privately owned 
entities, publicly owned property continues to be viewed as a fundamental 
pillar of the Chinese state.156 
This emphasis on public property protection manifests in Chinese law 
and public discourse.  In addition to Article 12 of the Constitution stipulating 
the “inviolable” nature of public property, Article 53 expressly includes the 
protection of public property as the duty of the Chinese citizen.157  The 
“sacred and inviolable” nature of state property and its collective ownership 
by “the whole people” is reiterated in Article 73 of the Principles of Civil 
Law.158  The infringement of state property is also a specific ground for 
criminal penalties under the Criminal Law. 159   A Chinese government 
hospital even utilized the argument that charging for hot water that was 
previously free was necessary to prevent loss of state property.160 
                                                                                                                                                              
REFLECTING AND LOOKING AHEAD, supra note 149, at 36-42.  Nonetheless, official policies until 2000 
envisaged private economic activities as merely supplementary of state-owned economic activities.  See id. 
152  This protection has been enshrined since the second version of the constitution.  See XIANFA 
[CONSTITUTION] art. 8 (1975) (China) (“Socialist public property is inviolable.  The state protects socialist 
public property.  Appropriation or damaging of state or collective property by any organization or 
individual by whatever means is prohibited.”). 
153  XIANFA [Constitution] art 13 (2004) (China) (“The lawful private property of citizens may not be 
encroached upon.  The state protects by law the right of citizens to own private property and the right to 
inherit private property.  The state may, for the public interest, expropriate or take over private property of 
citizens for public use, and pay compensation in accordance with the law.”).  Earlier mention of private 
property has been at best lukewarm.  See, e.g., XIANFA [Constitution] art. 13 (1982) (China) (“The state 
protects the right of citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses and other lawful property. The 
state protects according to law the right of citizens to inherit private property.”). 
154  XIANFA [Constitution], art. 6 (2004) (China). 
155  30 YEARS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA: REFLECTING AND LOOKING AHEAD, supra note 149, at 
36-41; GE YANG, supra note 151, at 40-61 (discussing the evolution of China’s property ownership regime). 
156  Wuquan Fa (五泉山发) [Property Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, 
effective Oct. 1, 2007) (China); 30 YEARS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA: REFLECTING AND LOOKING 
AHEAD, supra note 149, at 42; Mo Zhang, supra note 13, at 338-41. 
157  XIANFA [Constitution], art. 53 (2004) (China). 
158  Minfa Tongzhe [General Principles of the Civil Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) (China). 
159  Xing Fa [Criminal Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 
1, 1997, amended Feb. 25, 2011) (China). 
160  Lin Yunlin, Kunming Duojia Yiyuan gong Reshui Shoufei pa Gouyou Zichan Liushi? [Several 
Hospitals in Kunming Charges for Hot Water – Fear of Loss of State-owned Property?], LIANHE ZAOBAO 
(Sing.), Mar. 25, 2011. 
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2. “Regulatory Property”: Regulatory Permit as Public Property? 
 
The divergence in regulatory approaches between Singapore and 
China in the allocation mechanism for vehicle license quotas lies in the 
differing conceptualizations of public property.  The Singapore government 
recognizes the economic value of these vehicle licenses and treats them as 
valuable public property that should not be allocated without collection of 
appropriate charges.  Conversely, Chinese jurisprudence adopts a narrower 
conception of property that precludes recognizing regulatory permits as 
public property. 
 
a. Ambiguous status of intangible property 
 
One obstacle towards the recognition of regulatory permits as public 
property is the hesitation under Chinese jurisprudence towards recognition 
of property rights in intangible property.  While the enactment of the 
Property Law in 2007 is viewed as a monumental milestone in the 
recognition and protection of property rights, including private property 
rights, 161  the prevailing view in China is that intangible property is not 
covered by the Property Law.  Prominent Chinese property rights scholar 
Limin Wang emphasized that the Property Law is primarily meant for 
tangible property and argued for a distinction in the legal treatment of 
intangible property.162  Professors Yihua Zhang and Xiaojing Luo similarly 
opined that intangible property is, as a matter of principle, not covered by 
the general law of the Property Law163 even as they recognized that the 
international trend is an increased emphasis on the economic value of 
property as the defining characteristic of property rights.164  Indeed, while 
Articles 45 to 58 of the Property Law set forth different types of property 
owned by the state or collectives, the only intangible property explicitly 
referred to is the telecommunication spectrum.165  
Part of the confusion arises because of terminology.  The English 
translations of both caichan quan and wuquan is “property rights” even 
                                                      
161  LIANG HUIXING & CHEN HUABIN, WUQUAN FA [REAL RIGHT LAW] 36-37 (5th ed., 2008); Mo 
Zhang, supra note 13, at 336-37. 
162  WANG LIMIN, WUQUAN FALUN [PROPERTY LAW ] 13-15 (2d ed., 2008). 
163  WUQUAN FAXUE [PROPERTY RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE] 31-32 (Zhang Yihua & Luo Xiaojing eds., 
2010). 
164  Id.  
165  Id.  
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though the two phrases have different meanings.166  Wuquan has a narrower 
meaning, and generally refers to tangible property, as discussed in the 
previous paragraph.  Caichan quan, conversely, is given an essentially 
economic definition as rights to certain economic interests. 167   The 
interchangeable use of the concepts is unfortunately common.  For example, 
Liang Huixing and Chen Huabin, in their textbook on the Property Law, 
seem to regard them as equal in their discussion on the relationship between 
the constitutional protection of property (“caichan”) and the Property Law 
provisions against property infringement (“wuquan”).168  The Property Law 
(“law on wuquan”) itself only serves to confuse matters because while the 
bulk of the statute addresses conventional tangible property, there is a 
special chapter on ownership that addresses various state-owned property 
extensively in the broader economic sense (“stated-owned caichan”). 169  
Indeed, Article 45 provides a catchall provision that property (“caichan”) 
that is deemed to be owned by the state under the law shall be owned by the 
state. 
The exclusion of intangible property from the Property Law does not 
mean that intangible property is not recognized and protected under the law.  
Chinese academics do recognize that state-owned property (“caichan”) does 
include intangible property.170  There is also legal recognition in the courts 
that the business transactions of state-owned enterprises are part of their 
assets.171  Limin Wang’s exclusion of intangible property from the Property 
Law is premised on his argument that specific legislation that regulates 
matters relating to different classes of intangible property.172  This approach 
is indeed reflected in a recent interpretative book by the official law 
publisher for the State Council legal office. 173   Thus, while intangible 
property is not precluded from legal recognition as a form of property, the 
content and extent of legal protection (or the lack thereof) is contingent on 
specific legislation dealing with the particular form of intangible property.  
In the particular context of regulatory permits, the analysis of whether 
                                                      
166  See supra notes 160-165. 
167  PROPERTY RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 163, at 31; Mo Zhang, supra note 13, at 322. 
168  LIANG HUIXING & CHEN HUABIN, supra note 161, at 39-41. 
169  Wuquan fa (五泉山发) [Property Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, 
effective Oct. 1, 2007) (China). 
170  LIANG HUIXING & CHEN HUABIN, supra note 161, at 39-41. 
171  Wuquan fa (五泉山发) [Property Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, 
effective Oct. 1, 2007) (China). 
172  WANG LIMIN, supra note 162. 
173  WUQUAN FAX IN JIEDU [NEW INTERPRETATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS LAW] 4-5 (2010). 
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regulatory permits are part of public property (“caichan”) is dependent on 
the law governing regulatory permits—the Administrative Permit Law.174 
 
b. Administrative permits under the administrative permit law 
 
The Administrative Permit Law was enacted in 2003 to enhance 
administrative accountability and governance in China.175  The “legislative 
purpose clause” of the Administrative Permit Law framed the law as 
regulating administrative permits to protect the legal rights and interests of 
private entities and to promote the public interest and social order.176  The 
official legislative explanation of this clause also emphasizes the goal of 
effective implementation of the system of administrative permits and 
protecting the citizens and other private entities.177  This emphasis is echoed 
in the judicial interpretation of the Administrative Permit Law as well.178  
The recognition of administrative permits as a form of public property 
requiring valuable considerations before transfer to private entities is prima 
facie incompatible with the ostensible legislative focus on protecting private 
entities. 
The Administrative Permit Law does envision the use of market 
auctions as the allocation mechanism for regulatory permits under certain 
circumstances.  Article 53 read together with Article 12(2) of the 
Administrative Permit Law provides for the use of “tender, auction and other 
fair competitive measures” as the default means of allocating regulatory 
permits concerning the “exploitation of limited natural resources, allocation 
of public resources and market entry into industries that involve direct public 
interest.” 179   These two provisions were used by Chinese academics to 
justify the legality of the Shanghai auction of vehicle licenses. 180   The 
official legislative explanation of the Administrative Permit Law also 
conceived of the allocation of administrative permits relating to the use of 
                                                      
174  Xingzheng xuke fa [Administrative Permit Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2003, effective July 1, 2004) (China). 
175  ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGE GUO XINGZHENG XUKE FA SHIYI [EXPLANATION OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PERMIT LAW] 2-7 (Zhang Chunsheng & Li Fei eds., 2003). 
176  Administrative Permit Law (P.R.C.), supra note 174, at art. 1. 
177  EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PERMIT LAW, supra note 175, at 1-8. 
178  YANG LINPING, XINGZHENG XUKE SIFA JISHI LIJIE YU SHIYONG [UNDERSTANDING AND 
APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION ON ADMINISTRATIVE PERMIT] 32-40 (2010). 
179  Xingzheng xuke fa [Administrative Permit Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2003, effective July 1, 2004) (China). 
180  Yang Xiaojun & Huang Quan, supra note 63, at 109. 
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public or natural resources as analogous to a transfer of property rights and 
interests (“caichan quanli”) by the country to the permit holders.181 
 
3. Comparison with Singapore 
 
While Article 53 and Article 12(2) of the Administrative Permits Law 
seem to support the conceptualization of those regulatory permits as a form 
of property, there is a subtle but important distinction between this and the 
Singapore approach.  China’s recognition of the economic value of the 
administrative permit is tied to the economic value of the underlying 
resources.  This perspective works well for regulatory permits that allow 
direct exploitation or use of certain economically valuable resources, such as 
land, minerals, forestry, and telecommunication spectrums.182  For example, 
the requirement to pay a substantial monetary sum for an administrative 
permit to extract a certain amount of minerals or timber is legitimate and 
desirable because the permit holder is getting valuable resources in return. 
However, this perspective does not work well for regulatory permits 
whose economic value to the holder derives primarily from their mere 
scarcity instead of the conventionally perceived value of the activity 
permitted by the regulatory permits.  This accounts for the strong and 
persistent resistance to the use of a market auction to allocate vehicle 
licenses under a vehicle license quota scheme.  Notwithstanding the 
occasional academic support for the legality of Shanghai’s auction,183 the 
common refrain against the Shanghai auction stems from the payment of 
perceived “exorbitant” prices for the mere “basic” right to own a vehicle.184  
This is particularly important because the vehicle license quota system itself 
is also said to sacrifice an individual’s right to car usage.185  In a 2011 article 
in a prominent Chinese legal journal, Hu Lvyin made a concerted effort to 
defend the legality of the Shanghai auction.  However, his approach of 
advocating a non-conventional interpretation of the Property Law that views 
Shanghai’s auction as essentially auctioning the economically valuable right 
of road usage186 reflects the need to justify the high price of regulatory 
permits through the value of the activities. 
                                                      
181  EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PERMIT LAW, supra note 175, at 191. 
182  Id. at 173-74. 
183  Yang Xiaojun & Huang Quan, supra note 63. 
184  See, e.g., “Vehicle Licenses” Auction: Trump Card of Shanghai’s Management of Traffic 
Congestion, supra note 65 (quipping about Shanghai vehicle plates as the world’s most expensive license 
plate). 
185  Storm of Vehicle Purchase Restriction is Imminent,  supra note 68.  
186  Hu Lvyin, supra note 72, at 7. 
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The Singaporean government, in contrast, relies on the economic 
value of the regulatory permits without emphasizing the economic value of 
the activities permitted.  In the legislative debates on allocation mechanisms 
for the COEs, the justifications centered on the “windfall profit” that 
recipients might receive from queuing or balloting and how these recipients 
can simply cash in on the profit by selling the vehicle licenses to those who 
actually need the vehicles.187  Legislators did not rely on the economic value 
of car ownership to COE holders nor the costs to the government in 
providing the transportation infrastructure to accommodate the road usage as 
justifications for the high and rising prices of the COEs.188 
This approach is relevant for the other common forms of regulatory 
permits that provide substantial economic value to the holder, but are not 
conventionally associated with exploitation or use of valuable public 
resources.  The approval for change of land use or change in land use density 
under a development permit can dramatically increase the value of land for 
the permit holder.189  However, there is only a tangential relationship with 
the use of valuable resources (natural or public).190  The Singapore planning 
authority grants development permits for alterations of land use (including 
increasing land use intensity) only after the payment of development 
charges. 191   The Ministry of National Development sets the rate in 
consultation with the Chief Valuer, who takes into account current market 
values,192 which are currently set at 70% of the appreciation in land value.193  
                                                      
187  Certificate of Entitlement, supra note 12, at col. 729 (Mah Bow Tan); Select Committee Report on 
Land Transportation Policy, supra note 116, at col. 953 (Heng Chiang Meng). 
188  Certificate of Entitlement, supra note 12, at col. 729 (Mah Bow Tan).  Indeed, the COEs quota 
system was initially conceived as a price mechanism to “restrain” road usage without explicit mention of 
revenue generation.  See Select Committee Report on Land Transportation Policy, supra note 116, at col. 
953 (Heng Chiang Meng). 
189  Tom Allen, Controls over the Use and Abuse of Eminent Domain in England: A Comparative 
View, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 75, 95 (Robin Paul 
Malloy ed., 2008) (comparing the valuation of GBP 7000 per hectare of mixed use agricultural land versus 
GBP 2.6 million per hectare of residential “bulk” land). 
190  It may be theoretically possible to conceive of development permits as essentially allocating the 
scarce public resources of land use, where space among built-up areas at any given location is limited.  
However, it is very uncommon for discourses about granting development permits to revolve around 
resource allocation.  
191  Planning (Amendment) Bill, 23 HANSARD (Sing.) Col. 146 (statement of Lim Kim San, Minister 
for National Development) (1964); William J. M. Ricquier, Compulsory Purchase in Singapore, in TAKING 
LAND—COMPULSORY PURCHASE AND REGULATION IN ASIAN-PACIFIC COUNTRIES 263, 277 (Tsuyoshi 
Kotaka & David L. Callies ed., 2002). 
192  Kalpana Rashiwala, Prime Residential DC seen rising 20-35%; But Potential En Bloc Sellers 
remain Upbeat due to Positive Outlook, BUSINESS TIMES (Sing.), Feb. 10, 2007. 
193  Planning (Development Charges) Rules (Cap. 232, Section 40, 2007 Rev. Ed.) §10 (Sing.).  See 
also Jianlin Chen, Curbing Rent-Seeking and Inefficiency with Board Takings Powers and 
Undercompensation: The Case of Singapore from a Givings Perspective, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1, 34 
(2010). 
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The crucial aspect of Singapore’s development permit regime is that the 
development charges are premised on the “windfall” 194  or “increases in 
value of land” 195  to the permit holders.  There was no discussion of 
development permits involving allocation of scarce natural or public 
resources, as would be required to levy substantial monetary considerations 
under the Chinese Administrative Permit Law.196 
 
C. United States: Too Much “Public” in “Public Property” 
 
The difficulty Chinese jurisprudence has in conceiving of regulatory 
permits as a form of property can be contrasted with the conception of 
property in the United States that recognizes regulatory permits and other 
forms of government regulatory actions as forms of property.  However, the 
lack of market-based mechanisms in the United States permeates not just its 
traffic congestion policies, but in other policy realms as well.  This section 
traces the evolution of regulatory property and explains how the resistance 
toward market auction of regulatory permits in the United States is due to 
the one-sided “propertization” of regulatory property that predominantly 
emphasizes protection of personal constitutional liberty while overlooking 
the initial allocation aspect of property.  In addition, this section highlights 
how the association of public access with public property in the United 
States impedes the implementation of congestion pricing on public roads.    
 
1. Reich’s New Property, Regulatory Property and Statutory Property 
 
Despite its relatively recent development, the conceptualization of 
regulatory permits and other forms of government regulatory action as forms 
of property has become increasingly well established in common law 
jurisdictions.  The starting point of the “new property” is inevitably the 
seminal 1963 article by Charles A. Reich aptly titled “The New Property.”197  
In this article, Reich highlighted various forms of government-created 
wealth, including regulatory actions such as occupational licenses and 
franchises.198  He proposed the creation of private property rights, or rights 
                                                      
194  Planning (Amendment) Bill, 41 HANSARD (Sing.) col. 449 (statement of The Cheang Wan, 
Minister for National Development) (1982). 
195  Id.  (Lim Kim San). 
196  See supra Part IV B.2.b. 
197  Reich, supra note 16. 
198  Id. at 734-37. 
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of a similar nature, in this government-created wealth, with the aim of 
limiting governmental discretion in its allocation and recall.199 
Reich’s pioneering work led to the development of the “regulatory 
property” concept.  Bruce Yandle and Andrew P. Morriss identified 
“regulatory property” (“a property right created and allocated by a 
government entity”) as a distinct category from the commons, common 
property, public property and private property.200  Steven J. Eagle referred to 
the term “regulatory property” in describing the valuable regulatory permits 
that are essentially government-created monopoly privileges.201  Shi-Ling 
Hsu defines regulatory property as “property which is governmentally 
created by unbundling an asset from a regulated right and simultaneously 
imposing some restrictions on the regulated right and assigning some 
sovereignty over that right, such as the right to alienate.”202  Michael L. 
Wells and Alice E. Snedeker discussed the similar concept of “state-created 
property” that originates from laws and government actions and typically 
includes “jobs, building plans, business licenses, and other benefits that can 
only be taken away for cause.”203  Indeed, there has been increased judicial 
recognition of property in various regulatory licenses and benefits that has in 
turn allowed the imposition of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.204 
The concept of regulatory permits as property rights has been picked 
up in other common law jurisdictions as well. Australian courts recognized 
“statutory property”—property rights arising from bureaucratic-
administrative regulations.205  The context typically involves the issue of 
constitutional takings; for example, whether a privatized former state-owned 
telecommunications enterprise can be compelled to allow competitors’ 
access to its network hardware under statutorily determined compensation 
rates that are allegedly lower than market value206 or whether replacing bore 
licenses (for water) granted under previous legislation with bore licenses that 
                                                      
199  Id. at 778-85. 
200  Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice Among 
Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 129 (2001). 
201  Steven J. Eagle, The Really New Property: A Skeptical Appraisal, 43 IND. L. REV. 1229, 1239 
(2010). 
202  Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 813, 879 (2003). 
203  Wells & Snedeker, supra note 17, at 207. 
204  Id. at 172-77 (providing a good summary discussion on the various U.S. court cases on these 
issues); Lehavi, supra note 17, at 156-57.  
205  Kevin Gray, Regulatory Property and the Jurisprudence of Quasi-Public Trust, 32 SYDNEY L. 
REV. 221, 224-25 (2010) (discussing the Australian High Court case of Telstra Corporation Ltd v 
Commonwealth that confirmed the existence of this autonomous form of property). 
206  Id. at 222-24 (Telstra Corporation Ltd v Commonwealth). 
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contain fewer entitlements under new legislation is a taking.207  The courts in 
both cases recognized the property nature of the regulatory permits/licenses, 
but ultimately dismissed the takings challenge on the basis that these 
statutory property rights are defined by the ambit of the underlying statutes 
and are thus inherently fragile.208  In New Zealand, Thomas Gibbons has 
argued for the recognition of property rights in regulatory permits such as 
resource consents.209 
 
2. Differing Purposes: Creation of Personal Property Rights vs. 
Appreciation of Public Property Allocation 
 
An important feature of these developments is that the recognition of 
new forms of property in various government regulatory actions is premised 
primarily on protecting the rights and interests of individuals and not those 
of the state.  Academics frequently emphasize the individual-safeguarding 
aspect of the new property.210  Individual liberty is also in the forefront of 
Reich’s work. 211   Indeed, he later wrote of the need to “create more 
ownership rights” in these forms of government-created wealth to safeguard 
liberty.212 
There are others who recognize “new property” for reasons other than 
to protect individual liberty.  Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown proposed 
recognizing a work visa as a form of Reich’s new property,213 with the goal 
that such conception would facilitate her proposal that financial 
intermediaries (e.g., banks) serve as guarantors for visa applicants. 214  
However, this is entirely unnecessary because the proposal neither touches 
on the spirit of Reich’s new property (protecting private individuals) nor 
involves any property at all (her plan is about incentives for enforcement).  
Indeed, she differentiates her proposal from other “hard” utilizations of 
market mechanisms that involve allocating visas based on a hefty entry price 
or even an auction, noting that her plan merely serves to mitigate the 
                                                      
207  Thomas Gibbons, Property Rights in Resource Consents: Some Thoughts from Law and 
Economics, 25 NEW ZEALAND U. L. REV. 46, 66-67 (2012) (ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth). 
208  Id. at 66; Gray, supra note 205, at 224. 
209  See generally Gibbons, supra note 207. 
210  E.g., Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Visa as Property, Visa as Collateral, 64 VAND. L REV. 
1047, 1085 (2011); Eagle, supra note 201, at 1255; Gray, supra note 205, at 222; Wells & Snedeker, supra 
note 17, at 188-89. 
211  Reich, supra note 16, at 778-85. 
212  Charles A. Reich, The Liberty Impact of the New Property, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 295, 304-05 
(1990). 
213  Brown, supra note 210, at 1084-87. 
214  Id. at 1071-74. 
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information asymmetry in visa matters (by co-opting private financial 
intermediaries for screening and enforcement purposes). 215   Kevin Gray 
analogizes this “statutory property” and the correlative “regulatory property” 
with the quasi-public trust216 to justify the “coupling of commercial privilege 
with social obligations” (i.e., facilitating limitations for the public interest on 
otherwise private property).217  This renders his reference to Reich’s “new 
property” 218 a little ironic and arguably misconceived.219 
In any event, the protection of individual liberty and safeguarding 
individual rights remains the predominant theme in the recognition of such 
“new property” as regulatory permits and other government actions.  Of 
course, there is nothing wrong per se in such a justification for “new 
property.”  Indeed, the expansion of government in both expenditures and 
scope renders such government-created wealth even more important220 and 
has the dangerous side-effect of magnifying governmental power and 
dominion over private individuals through the inherent accessory powers 
arising from discretion and choice in wealth allocation.221  This increases 
dependence of individuals on the government and risks making 
compromising one’s individual rights a condition of accepting this 
government-created wealth.222  This state of affairs also aggravates social 
inequality because powerful, wealthy, and well-organized interest groups 
can be expected to co-opt the government in furtherance of their interests, to 
the detriment of the broader society.223 
The current emphasis on the liberty-safeguarding functions of new 
property is problematic because it often ends up focusing only on situations 
that involve the deprivation of these rights.  Wells and Snedeker argue that 
recognizing new property in “jobs, building plans, business licenses, and 
other benefits” is necessary because it “addresses the constitutional problem 
created by the tension between persons in a free society entitled to rely on 
keeping rights they have acquired, and the government seeking (for good or 
bad reasons) to take those interests away.”224  While Reich’s original work 
                                                      
215  Id. at 1099-1101. 
216  Gray, supra note 205, at 231-38. 
217  Id. at 227-30. 
218  Id. at 239. 
219  One key justification for the creation of “new property” is the harm to civil liberties and personal 
independence arising from conditioning the allocation of government largess on broadly construed notions 
of “public interests.”  Reich, supra note 16, at 774-77. 
220  Id. at 737-38. 
221  Id. at 746-51.  See also Reich, supra note 212, at 299 (“With new property, government is always 
tempted to use its power over a particular form of wealth to control some unrelated kind of behavior.”). 
222  Reich, supra note 16, at 756-64; Reich, supra note 212, at 303. 
223  Reich, supra note 16, at 764-68. 
224  Wells & Snedeker, supra note 17, at 188-89. 
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discusses in some detail the proposed limits on governmental discretion in 
allocating this property, his primary concern is the imposition of 
“unconstitutional conditions” on the granting of such rights and the inclusion 
of considerations that are irrelevant to the regulatory power.225  He also 
opined on the need for procedural safeguards, including the requirement of a 
fair hearing following the denial of any privilege or benefit,226 adding that 
higher standards should be applied to governmental actions that have the 
effect of a penal sanction.227 
The other important aspect of property—the initial allocation 
mechanisms—is often overlooked to the extent that it does not implicate 
personal liberty or rights.  Thus, granting regulatory permits without 
receiving valuable consideration in exchange posed no problems for Reich 
and like-minded academics. 228   Indeed, such free allocations are even 
encouraged.229   This is in contrast with traditional forms of government 
property, such as real property (e.g., land) or government contracts, where 
any allocation or distribution to private entities without adequate 
consideration will almost inevitably raise a red flag.  For example, 
“newspapers and magazines have been filled with articles about awarding of 
noncompetitive contracts to politically connected companies.”230  The small 
costs borne by private developers in the acquisition of land via eminent 
domain adds to controversies relating to eminent domain. 231   Such 
considerations are conspicuously absent in the discourse about new property. 
One possible justification for this distinction is that “new” property 
typically emanates from regulatory actions of the government in which 
allocations are already premised on public interests considerations.  For 
                                                      
225  Reich, supra note 16, at 778-84. 
226  Id. at 783. 
227  Id. at 784-85. 
228  The premise of Reich’s article is that government is dispensing wealth and distributing largess.  Id. 
at 733. 
229  For example, these theories approved of educational aid without conditions on behavior and 
speech attached.  Reich, supra note 216, at 303-04. 
230  Lani A. Perlman, Guarding the Government’s Coffers: The Need for Competition Requirements to 
Safeguard Federal Procurement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3187, 3189 (2007). 
231  Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on 
Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2006).  This article examines 
several eminent domain controversies, including a ninety-nine year lease for just one dollar per year, 
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City of Detroit condemned land and then transferred this land to General Motors for a new factory.  Id.  
Detroit transferred the land for USD 8 million even though project would cost the public USD 200 million.  
Id.  The Michigan Supreme Court upheld this use of eminent domain in Neighborhood Council v. City of 
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).  Id.  In a third example, Blanchard v. Department of 
Transportation, 798 A.2d 1119 (Me. 2002), the state of Maine seized a lot and gave it to a developer for 
one dollar.  Id.   
34 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 1 
 
example, the allocation of telecommunication spectrum licenses without 
collection of any monetary considerations was justified on the basis that the 
allocations were and should be made based on considerations of public 
interest rather than profit-making potential.232  Thus, it is unnecessary to 
consider whether market value has been charged for these regulatory permits 
and new property.  This argument mitigates, but does not resolve the 
criticism.  Allocation of traditional property frequently comes with public 
interest conditions.  For example, public land may be sold or leased with 
conditions attached, such as maintaining public access or achieving 
conservation goals. 233  Government contracts may also be set aside 
specifically for small businesses or for minority-owned or female-owned 
businesses to support these socially and economically disadvantaged 
groups. 234   The attachment of conditions premised on public interest 
considerations is a factor that can reduce or even negate the monetary 
considerations that the government might otherwise recoup.235  Nonetheless, 
it is only a factor.  The starting point in deciding the appropriate allocation of 
property, whether traditional property or new property, should include 
consideration of whether monetary charges based on the market values of 
this property should be imposed. 
This deficiency can be observed in the context of the allocation of 
regulatory permits for the use of the telecommunication spectrum.  Prior to 
1981, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) adopted the 
command-and-control approach, allocating spectrum use through 
“comparative hearings.”236  Given the great value of the licenses allocated 
and substantial discretion afforded to the FCC, political peddling was an 
                                                      
232  John A. Rogovin & Rodger D. Citron, Lessons from the Nextwave Saga: The Federal 
Communications Commission, the Courts and the Use of Market Forms to Perform Public Functions, 57 
ADMIN. L. REV. 687, 692 (2005); David Moss & Michael Feinn, Radio Regulation Revisited: Coase, the 
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Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 35-36 (1959). 
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234 See CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, BUYING SOCIAL JUSTICE: EQUALITY, GOVERNMENT 
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affirmative policies in U.S. government procurement). 
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Frederick E. Ellrod III & Nicholas P. Miller, Property Rights, Federalism, and the Public Rights-of-Way, 
26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 475, 485 n.30 (2003). 
236 Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Spectrum Reallocation and the National Broadband Plan, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 
87, 90-91 (2011); Susan P. Crawford, The Radio and the Internet, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 966 
(2008); Jerry Ellig, Costs and Consequences of Federal Telecommunications Regulations, 58 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 37, 77 (2006). 
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unsurprising feature of such hearings.237  Protests about the arbitrariness of 
regulatory allocation prompted the allocation to be replaced in 1981 by a 
lottery in which most of the licenses awarded by the lottery were resold.238  
However, there remained room for political influence because entry into the 
lottery was subject to certain qualifications that were determined by the 
authorities.239  Indeed, the legislative history of the federal licensing regime 
is characterized by legislators maximizing “political support by arbitrating a 
rent-seeking competition for valuable licenses.”240  It was only in 1993 that 
Congress finally authorized the FCC to auction spectrum licenses through 
competitive bidding.241  In 1997, bidding was made mandatory for future 
licensing proceedings with limited exemptions.242 
The substantial economic value of these regulatory permits relating to 
the use of the telecommunication spectrum has never been questioned.  
However, it is significant that the issue has never really been framed the 
perspective of public property allocation.  The primary rationale for the 
adoption of a market auction remains awarding licenses to the highest 
valuers. 243   There have been attempts to justify market auction through 
analogizing spectrum use to conventional property (such as the use of 
pasture or logging rights).244  Nonetheless, such arguments failed to stick.  
Indeed, the “modern consensus” of the United States’ spectrum policy is that 
market mechanisms (including auction and secondary markets) are the 
preferred methods for assigning spectrum rights because the primary goal is 
to allocate the spectrum to its highest value use.245  While the “[r]ecovery for 
the public of a portion of the value of the public spectrum resource made 
available for commercial use” was also stated as an objective underlying the 
new auction mechanism in the 1990s,246 this was primarily in response to the 
substantial budgetary pressure facing the government at that time247 instead 
of a genuine appreciation of the public property nature of the regulatory 
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permits.  Even the increasing emphasis on the revenue-generating aspect of 
spectrum auction in recent times is premised on the efficiency of this form of 
revenue generation compared to distorting incentives from conventional 
taxes. 248   It is difficult to imagine a similar tortuous evolution in the 
allocation of traditional property, such as land or government contracts. 
This contrasts markedly with Singapore’s approach.  When selecting 
the mechanism of allocating its 3G telecommunication licenses in 2001, the 
Singapore government decided on a competitive auction instead of a “beauty 
contest” mechanism in which the regulatory authority was forced to decide 
on the merits of the applications of telecommunication service providers.249  
As with the justifications advanced in support of the use of the auction 
mechanism in allocating COEs, 250  an important rationale driving the 
Singapore government’s decision is the prevention of “immediate windfall 
profit” under the “beauty contest” system.251  The Minister expressly stated 
that “the Government has a responsibility to obtain fair value for a scarce 
resource.”252 
Thus, while regulatory permits are recognized as “property” in both 
the United States and Singapore, the premise for their recognition is 
different.  The United States’ recognition is driven by the desire to introduce 
safeguards to the recipients and beneficiaries of government regulatory 
actions.  Conversely, the recognition in Singapore is to facilitate the claim of 
public ownership on the economic values of these regulatory actions. 
 
3. Two Types of Public Property 
 
The other feature of United States discourse surrounding public 
property is that the “public” in public property can indicate two things.  
First, it can indicate “public” as opposed to “private” ownership.  This is 
salient in the context of inter-government takings as the U.S. Supreme Court 
clarified that eminent domain of publicly owned property is subject to just 
compensation even though the Fifth Amendment refers only to “private 
                                                      
248  Thomas W. Hazlett, Roberto E. Muňoz & Diego B. Avanzini, What Really Matters in Spectrum 
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property.”253  “Public” ownership is also relevant in the application of the 
Establishment Clause, where display of religious symbols on publicly owned 
property (but not privately owned property) risks violating the prohibition on 
the state’s establishment of religion.254  The loss and squandering of publicly 
owned property is also an important theme in the discourse of corruption.255 
There is, however, another common, but different understanding of 
public property.  Public property is also often associated with public access.  
For example, David Fagundes’s critique about the lack of public outrage 
over the loss of public property when the Supreme Court upheld the 
Copyright Term Extension Act in Eldred v. Ashcroft256 (extending copyright 
protection by twenty years returns what should otherwise be public property 
back to private hands)257 assumes that public property signifies property with 
public access.258  Legal scholar Amnon Lehavi recognized that it is easy to 
conflate property with “private property” when there are different types of 
property regimes such as common property, public property, and open-
access property.259  Public property is again conceptualized as property that 
is utilized by the public. 260   Bruce Yandle and Andrew P. Morriss’s 
classification of property into common property, public property, private 
property, and regulatory property focused on the entity controlling the 
property, with public property being “property controlled by government.”261  
They observed that the appropriate level of management for the resources 
may depend on the circumstances.262  Inherent in their analysis, however, is 
that public control of “public property” assumes a certain degree of public 
access by contrast with the more exclusive “private property.”263  Carol M. 
Rose’s conceptualization of public property in her critical examinations on 
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the problems arising from the exclusive nature of private property similarly 
assumes public ownership and public access.264 
The association of public property with public use and public access 
can be traced to ancient Roman law, which recognized that certain property 
cannot be privately owned or was exclusive to the public.265   The first 
category is res communes – property that cannot be legally owned, but 
which the right to enjoy by all is recognized by the law.266  Typical examples 
include air, running water, and the sea.267  Another similar concept, res 
publicae, involves property such as public roads, rivers, and harbors that are 
typically owned by the state, but which private property interest can exist 
therein.  However, regardless of ownership, the public cannot be excluded 
from access and enjoyment.268  This Roman tradition of treating roads and 
other key avenues of transportation as classic public property to which 
public access should be ensured is carried on in the American public trust 
doctrine.269   
This conceptualization of at least some forms of public property as 
property where the public is entitled the right to access helps to account for 
the prevailing opposition towards congestion pricing and other tolls.  As 
Carlos Sun observed, “[s]ome believe that travelling is a right and that roads 
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are public goods, and as such they should be ‘free.’”270  In the context of the 
New York City congestion-pricing proposal, opponents argued about the 
“fundamental fairness problems of charging access to public streets.”271  
Opponents also allude to the ideal of roads being accessed by all, rich and 
poor.272  Indeed, Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill observed “[w]e 
tend to think of public property as something open to all members of the 
public on equal terms.”273  Elsewhere, in India, “the creation of toll roads 
remains anathema to many Indians, who see roads as public property for 
trucks, rickshaws and ox-carts alike.”274 
Part of the problem is the conflation of public access with free public 
access.  Carol M. Rose correctly pointed out that public access does not 
necessarily imply absence of government intervention.275  Nonetheless, her 
categorization of the primary goal of government intervention as ensuring 
orderly access of public property by private entities 276  still renders 
ambiguous whether the imposition of fees or license quotas is an affront 
towards public access.  Rose acknowledged that toll roads are permissible 
“if the public is otherwise adequately served.”277   However, this simply 
leaves open the question of whether the amount of toll levied is a factor in 
determining whether the public is adequately served.  In particular, it is 
arguable that high toll charges on key transport routes—despite their 
necessity due to severe congestion—would have violated even Rose’s more 
nuanced understanding of public access. 
The Singapore government, conversely, justified the congestion 
charges as a charge for the “privilege to drive into the restricted area.”278  In 
a similar vein, the government has no hesitation to speak about using 
congestion prices to “control,” 279  “regulate,” 280  and “restrain” 281  traffic.  
                                                      
270  Sun, supra note 24, at 284 (noting that “people confuse the right to free transportation with the 
constitutional rights that guarantee citizens to move freely between states, to visit another state, or to enjoy 
state benefits after relocation.”). 
271  Dan Janison, Spin Cycle: A New Spin on Traffic Plan?, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 7, 2007, at 
A16. 
272 Wes Smith, Minneapolis Drivers Will be Able to Buy Way into Fast Lane, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 
12, 1997, at C4. 
273  Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, Private Rights in Public Lands: the Chicago Lakefront, 
Montgomery Ward, and the Public Dedication Doctrine, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1417, 1521 (2011). 
274  John Stackhouse, Indian Economy in Desperate Need of a New Foundation Infrastructure, THE 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Canada), Feb. 28, 1997, at B10. 
275  Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators, supra note 2, at 99. 
276  Id.  
277  Id.  
278  Budget, Ministry of Communications, supra note 129, at Col. 582-583 (Yong Nyuk Lin). 
279  Full-Day Area Licensing Scheme (Reasons for Introduction), 61 HANSARD (Sing) col. 502, at col. 
504 (Minister for Communications, Mah Bow Tan) (1993). 
280  Certificate of Entitlement, supra note 12, at col. 731 (Mah Bow Tan). 
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Indeed, when a more draconian vehicle restriction mechanism that was 
similar to the “odds and evens” license plate vehicle authorization282 was 
rejected, the rationale was that “[t]his is much too high a level of restriction 
on the movement of private cars for the time being.”283  The concept of 
public access to roads does not feature prominently in Singapore discourse 
about roads management.  The next Part will argue that this decoupling of 
public access from public property is a preferable approach. 
 
V. PUBLIC PROPERTY REEXAMINED 
 
The comparative analysis in the previous Part highlights the 
divergence in the conceptualization of public property in the United States, 
China, and Singapore.  Drawing from the approach in Singapore, this Part 
advances a framework of public property that involves a broad economic 
understanding of “property” to include regulatory permits and a reorientation 
of “public” that focuses on public ownership and not public access. 
 
A. What Should “Public Property” Mean? 
 
How should public property be properly conceived?  To answer that 
question, this Part analyzes the definition of “property,” the definition of 
“public,” and the relationship between public property and other forms of 
property.   
 
1. “Property” 
 
It is useful to start with the “property” part of “public property.”  A 
narrow definition of property that excludes valuable resources is 
undesirable.  In particular, the concept of property should include regulatory 
permits and other regulatory actions that confer economic benefits to 
recipients. 284   From the economics perspective, there is no fundamental 
                                                                                                                                                              
281  Select Committee Report on Land Transportation Policy, supra note 116, at Col. 935 (Hong Hai). 
282  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
283  Budget, Ministry of Communications, supra note 129, at col. 582 (Yong Nyuk Lin). 
284  Conceptually, this article considers all regulatory permits to be public property.  Some regulatory 
permits are by default of only negligible economic value to the holders.  In particular, regulatory permits 
that are not limited in number and that do not require satisfaction of certain qualifying conditions (e.g., 
incorporation license under modern corporation law regime) do not by themselves confer any noteworthy 
economic benefits to the holder.  This article considers these “worthless” regulatory permits as public 
property because the fact that a property is of negligible economic value (e.g. a pebble in one’s backyard) 
neither negates the status of property nor the right of entitlement.  The lack of economic value means that 
considerations of efficiency and redistribution discussed in this sub-section are less pertinent for this type 
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distinction between “property” and “regulation” because both can be equally 
valuable.285  This is particularly true for regulatory permits whose numbers 
are limited under a regulatory scheme. 286   The holder of these limited 
regulatory permits, such as the taxi medallions in New York City, enjoys 
economically valuable de facto monopolistic rent that accounts for its high 
price.287  The fact that some of these regulatory permits are tradable further 
enhances their value.  The right of alienation of an asset accounts for a large 
portion of its value by allowing a higher value (or more efficient) user to 
obtain the asset. 288 
A conceptualization of property that does not include these regulatory 
permits is incomplete for two reasons.  First, the important issue about the 
efficient allocation of these public resources is sidestepped.  Efficiency 
considerations of resource allocation typically involves an analysis of the 
following three factors: whether the property is allocated to the highest value 
user, whether there are any externalities (positive or negative) associated 
with its use, and the cost of the allocation process.289  Regulatory permits 
and other regulatory licenses, particularly those that are limited in number, 
typically represent rights to resource utilization.  The nature of regulatory 
permits and other regulatory actions usually indicates that the externalities 
consideration dominates the allocation decision and typically manifests in 
various forms of public interest considerations upon which allocation 
decisions are based.290  Thus, telecommunications spectrum licenses might 
be allocated to television stations engaging in public broadcasting that is 
deemed to be beneficial to the public,291 or development permits (such as 
zoning decisions) may be granted to projects that benefit the surrounding 
neighborhood.292 
                                                                                                                                                              
of regulatory permit.  Hence, this article concentrates only on regulatory permits and regulatory actions that 
confer economically valuable benefits to the recipients.   
285  STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 332 (3d ed. 2005). 
286  Shi-Ling Hsu, supra note 202, at 882; Yandle & Morriss, supra note 200, at 144, 161.   
287  Eagle, supra note 201, at 1239. 
288  Shi-Ling Hsu, supra note 202, at 868, 882. 
289  For a general overview on the economic perspective, see STEPHEN J. SPURR, ECONOMIC 
FOUNDATIONS OF LAW 69-78 (2d ed. 2010); MOORE MCDOWELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 180-86 
& 329-35 (2d European ed. 2009); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 85-99 (4th ed. 
2004). 
290  MOORE MCDOWELL ET AL., supra note 289, at 405-19. 
291  Rogovin & Citron, supra note 232, at 692; Moss & Feinn, supra note 232, at 407-412.  Cf., Coase, 
supra note 232, at 12-17 (expressing skepticism of the public interest justification). 
292  E.g., Dianne Draper, Toward Sustainable Mountain Communities: Balancing Tourism 
Development and Environmental Protection in Banff and Banff National Park, Canada, 29 AMBIO 408, 
414 (2000) (discussing the granting of commercial development permits in a small Canadian mountain 
town on the basis that the development meet the natural historic heritage standard). 
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However, there are many other instances where the highest value user 
consideration should have taken a more prominent role.  For example, in the 
case of limited vehicle license regimes in selected Chinese cities, ensuring 
that the vehicle licenses go to users who value vehicle usage the most is 
particularly important in terms of the overall efficiency of the regulatory 
scheme (beyond the narrow category of non-profit vehicle usage, such as 
ambulances, police vehicles, and other public service vehicles that are 
typically exempted from the quota in any event).293  Similarly, there are few 
reasons why allocation to the highest value users should not be the primary 
allocation factor for commercial users in the context of the 
telecommunications spectrum.294  In both instances, the limitation in the 
number of permits and licenses under the respective regulatory schemes is 
necessary to tackle the negative externalities arising from the use of 
resources.  However, inefficiency in the form of underutilization of 
resources can still occur during the allocation of the permits and licenses if 
the recipients of such permits and licenses are not in a position to make full 
use of the permits and licenses.295 
Second, failure to frame the allocation of regulatory permits as an 
allocation of public property obscures the potential wealth transfers that take 
place in these regulatory decisions.  Regulatory permits represent substantial 
economic value for the select few to whom they are allocated.  Recipients of 
the vehicles licenses in Beijing lottery allocation are essentially winners of a 
state-sponsored lottery.  There might, of course, be scenarios in which such 
wealth transfers are intended and desirable.  The role of such wealth 
redistribution in the proposed definition of “public property” will be 
explored further in the next section.  The main considerations for now are 
scenarios in which redistribution is not the primary consideration of the 
particular regulatory regime.  Vehicle license permits and the management of 
traffic congestion in general are not set up to help vulnerable or socio-
economically disadvantaged communities.  In these scenarios, ignoring the 
substantial wealth transfer in regulatory allocation decisions invites 
corruption and rent-seeking 296  into the allocation process. 297   The 
                                                      
293  One example is a special set-aside of ten percent of the total vehicles license quota for public 
interest organizations in Beijing.  See Zhou An, supra note 66. 
294  Goodman, supra note 243, at 352-53. 
295  This is especially so where there are restrictions on transfers (which are common for regulatory 
permits) or there are significant transaction costs that impede secondary trading.   
296  Rent-seeking is the process by which private entities seek to increase their share of existing wealth 
via exploiting the political process for redistributing wealth.  For a recent general restatement on rent-
seeking, see GORDON TULLOCK, THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (2005). 
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government’s regulatory powers are a fertile source of rent.298  Indeed, rent 
seeking involves power-holders utilizing their power to create “new” 
property rights that generate a flow of income to themselves.299  It is possible 
to conceptualize the government power to redistribute entitlements as a form 
of property, with public corruption as a form of theft.300 
In the same vein, this wealth transfer also represents a huge loss to the 
public coffers.  In the absence of ostensible redistributive considerations, 
there is little justification for private entities deriving huge benefits from 
government regulatory actions.  Even if transfers are ostensibly prohibited 
under the regulatory scheme, creative corporate structuring and other 
contractual arrangements can still allow regulatory permit holders to enjoy 
huge benefits by effectively “selling” the permits to others.  In the case of 
the telecommunication spectrum allocation during the pre-auction days in 
the United States, the telecommunication spectrum licenses were essentially 
sold at high prices via transfers of ownership by the radio and television 
stations. 301  Indeed, “virtually all current spectrum licenses paid for their 
spectrum” as a result of the fact that almost all broadcast stations have 
experienced at least one ownership change since receiving their broadcast 
licenses. 302   Similarly, a lucky winner of the otherwise non-transferable 
Beijing vehicle licenses can obtain huge monetary payments through a 
“long-term lease” of their vehicles.303  Conversely, huge public revenues are 
derived from the auctioning of such vehicle licenses in Shanghai and 
Singapore.  This allows the government to capture economic benefits that 
are otherwise randomly allocated to private entities without any coherent 
redistributive considerations.  This loss of public revenue not only implicates 
fairness issues in which some individuals enjoy particular benefits at the 
expense of the public, 304  but also affects efficiency because revenue 
                                                                                                                                                              
297 Jianlin Chen, Curbing Rent-Seeking and Inefficiency with Board Takings Powers and 
Undercompensation: The Case of Singapore from a Givings Perspective, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1, 21-
24 (2010). 
298  See EAGLE, supra note 285, at 25; ANDERSON & HUGGINS, supra note 1, at 76. 
299  See Howard Dick, Why Law Reform Fails—Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Reforms, in LAW 
REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES 42, 46-47 (2007). 
300  See Paul B. Stephan, Rationality and Corruption in the Post-Socialist World, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 
533, 536-37 (1999). 
301  Coase, supra note 232, at 22-23. 
302  See Eisenach, supra note 236, at 117. 
303  Ai, supra note 66; Storm of Vehicle Purchase Restriction is Imminent, supra note 68; Zhou An, 
supra note 66. 
304  See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 554 (2001). 
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generated through the sale of public resources/assets do not share the 
identical distorting incentives from conventional taxes.305 
 
2. “Public” 
 
The “public” in “public property” should be reoriented to focus on 
public ownership rather than public access or public utilization.  The current 
conceptualization of public property tends to include public utilization or 
access as one of its defining characteristics.  The danger of this 
conceptualization is that it fuses the two separate issues of ownership and 
allocation, which involve different and distinct analytical considerations.  
This preempts the otherwise important question of the appropriate mode of 
its allocation.  Stipulating that resources should be available for public 
utilization is merely a form of an allocation decision—it can be changed and 
should be changed depending on the prevailing socio-economic conditions 
and the available technologies.306 
Public access as a means of allocating resources enjoys the critical 
advantages of low enforcement costs and can be efficient under 
circumstances in which the risk of resource over-exploitation is low and the 
utilization of resources imposes minimal negative externalities on other 
users.  However, these circumstances are not constant, and resources that are 
efficiently allocated via public access in an earlier age may require other 
modes of allocation in later times.  Technology advancement may reduce the 
costs of other allocation mechanisms while increased density of utilization 
(e.g., through population growth) may give rise to over-exploitation and/or 
negative externalities.  For example, national parks are typical public 
property.307  Nonetheless, as overcrowding arising from increased demand 
leads to the degradation of the enjoyment of the visitors and of the natural 
environment, 308  implementing a limited quota of park permits 309  or 
increasing user fees for the park310 may be necessary to conserve its natural 
value.  Indeed, the institution of private property is largely irrelevant where 
                                                      
305  See Hazlett, Muňoz & Avanzini,  supra note 248, at ¶26-27; Hazlett, Porter & Smith, supra note 
248, at 140. 
306  See Yandle & Morriss, supra note 200, at 167-68.  
307  Id. at 129.  See also Jeffery, supra note 236 at 97-103 (discussing the establishment of National 
Parks in the United States and noting the rationale of ensuring access and enjoyment of all citizens). 
308  Jeffery, supra note 236, at 100-01; Catherine M. Pickering & Ralf C. Buckley, Swarming the 
Summit: Managing Tourists at Mt Kosciuszko, Australia, 23 MOUNTAIN RES. & DEV. 230, 231-32 (2003). 
309  Pickering & Buckley, supra note 308, at 232-33. 
310  Jeffery, supra note 236, at 132-33 (noting the disparity in revenue generated by the low user fees 
and the high costs of operating expenses in the United States and the practice in Kenya of charging high 
fees for foreign nationals but low fees for locals). 
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there is an abundance of resources,311 but may be necessary to avoid the 
tragedies of the commons in the light of intense competing use.312 
This danger is demonstrated in the strong public resistance towards 
congestion pricing in the United States.  There is opposition to congestion 
pricing and other restrictions on vehicle usage in part because these 
allocation schemes infringe on the perceived right of public access. 313  
Indeed, public roads have been the quintessential public property with 
inherent rights of public access since Roman times.314  While the allocation 
mechanisms of public access were arguably efficient at that time, the modern 
reality of the high density of users challenges the continued efficiency of 
such an allocation.  Similarly, technological advancement has substantially 
reduced the cost of alternative allocation mechanisms.  Singapore congestion 
pricing was facilitated by the emergence of affordable electronic transponder 
technology.315  However, the assumption of public access—or worse, public 
free access316—as the defining characteristic of a certain class of public 
property unnecessarily impedes the adoption of otherwise effective 
mechanisms to alleviate the real social costs imposed by congestion. 
Hence, the defining characteristics of “public” in “public property” 
should be “public ownership.”  The fact that a property owned by the public 
is subject to public access merely represents that public access is the 
allocation mechanism that the public (via its governing institution) has 
chosen for that particular property.  As an allocation mechanism, public 
access may be normatively desirable after taking into account public interest 
considerations such as redistribution.  Public access may also be at times the 
most economically efficient allocation mechanism for those resources.  
However, the public, through the appropriate governing institution, should 
be allowed to freely change its chosen allocation mechanisms in response to 
changes in public interest considerations or changes in technology and 
utilization patterns. 
 
                                                      
311  Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 304; Rose, The Comedy of the Commons,  supra note 2, at 717-18. 
312  Merrill, supra  note 1, 2085-86 (2012); Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators, supra note 
2, at 90. 
313  See supra Part III.C.3. 
314  Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators, supra note 2, at 96-97. 
315  See supra Part II.D.2.   
316  See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text. 
46 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 1 
 
3. The Relationship Between Public Property and Other Forms of 
Property 
 
The decoupling of public access from “public property” clarifies the 
relationship between public property and the other forms of property 
arrangements.  Public property tends to be regarded either as a form of 
property arrangement, parallel to private property, common property and 
others,317 or as the starting point of an evolutionary process that ends with 
private property.318  The proper relationship should be neither.  Just like how 
public access is merely an allocation mechanism, the other property 
arrangements are allocation mechanisms as well, be it the emphasis of 
identifiable ownership under private property, 319  the heavy government 
intervention in regulatory property,320 or the hybrid property arrangements 
that can involve varying combinations of private, common, and public 
elements.321  Thus, under the proposed public property framework, private 
property is simply public property that is allocated through discrete (and 
often alienable) private rights to resources.  Similarly, the collective property 
in China where villagers’ committees enjoyed some form of autonomous 
control and ownership over rural land 322  is another form of allocating 
publicly-owned property in a legal regime that was hostile towards private 
property. 
The proposed public property framework does not make any 
normative claim about the appropriate allocation mechanism, which would 
involve a context-specific inquiry into the various considerations such as 
transaction costs, resources scarcity, redistribution, and equality.323  Rather, 
the normative thrust of the proposed framework is simply that where 
allocation of publicly owned resources is involved (including the continued 
utilization of public access as means of allocation), it will be up to the 
                                                      
317  E.g., Yandle & Morriss, supra note 200, at 129; Lehavi supra note 259, at 2004. 
318  E.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347-59 (1967); 
Wyman, supra note 1, 124-25. 
319  See Merrill, supra note 1, at 2065. 
320  See Yandle & Morriss, supra note 200, at 133. 
321  See Lehavi, supra note 17. 
322  See Frank Xianfeng Huang, The Path to Clarity: Development of Property Rights in China, 17 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 191, 211-16 (2004); Shitong Qiao, Governing the Post-Socialist Transitional 
Commons: A Case from Rural China, 24 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 117, 127-31 (2013) (discussing 
how market and political reform since 1980s have weakened the institutional capacity of villagers’ 
committees to assert effective control over the property that are theoretically and legally under their charge).  
323  See Lehavi, supra note 17, at 202-09; Yandle & Morriss, supra note 200, at 133-148; Merrill, 
supra note 1, at 2081-94 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of private property as an allocation 
mechanism); Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 335-55 (arguing for a functional definition of property that 
focuses on the practical consequences on resources utilization).  
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appropriate entity or entities empowered and entrusted with collective 
decision-making on behalf of the public to select the appropriate allocation 
mechanism. 
There is inevitably debate on the identity of the decision-maker and 
the manner of the decision-making process. 324   There may be internal 
conflicts between the different public bodies, such as tension between local 
and central government325 or between different government agencies.326  The 
jurisdictional lacuna for resources that lies beyond national boundary (e.g., 
fisheries)327 or that span across jurisdiction (e.g., greenhouse emission)328 
can also impede meaningful decision-making on the allocation mechanism.  
Such issues of governance and institutional design are beyond the scope of 
this article.  Nonetheless, the proposed public property framework will 
emphasize that insofar as there is an operational governance structure in 
place to represent the otherwise amorphous notion of public, there will 
usually be an entity (or entities) that can and should consciously make these 
allocation decisions. 
 
B. Redistribution, Government Incentive and Regulatory Burden 
 
Conceiving of public property to include regulatory permits while 
downplaying the right of public access is not without controversy.  The 
objections can be sorted into two categories.  First, there are concerns about 
the adverse redistribution effects whereby the low-income segment of the 
population would be excluded in the market allocation of regulatory permits 
and public resources that were previously allocated without charge.  Second, 
the potential for raising revenue through the market allocation of these 
“new” public property rights risks distracting government from the exclusive 
pursuit of genuine public interest goals.  These objections will be addressed 
                                                      
324  E.g., Lehavi, supra note 259 (arguing that major decisions on arranging property rights should be 
made by government entities entrusted with the power and duty of collective decision-making, i.e. 
legislative and administrative bodies). 
325  E.g., Schill, supra note 253, at 880-88 (arguing that just compensation for takings of publicly-
owned property is justified to protect local and state government from the nation’s political process). 
326  E.g., Scott R. Christensen & Akin Rabibhadana, Exit, Voice, and the Depletion of Open Access 
Resources: The Political Bases of Property Rights in Thailand, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 639, 643-54 (1994) 
(discussing the bureaucratic conflict among the different government agencies that plagued and inhibited 
land use in Thailand). 
327  See Robert J. McManus, America’s Saltwater Fisheries: So Few Fish, So Many Fishermen, 9(4) 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 13, 13 (1995) (noting the “creeping jurisdiction” initiated by the United States 
in the 1960s to enforce regulatory control on water surface previously excluded from national regulation). 
328  See John G. Sprankling, The Emergence of International Property Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 461, 475-
77 (2012) (discussing the development of international law towards the establishment of tradable emission 
allowance). 
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below, together with the affirmative case for how the proposed definition of 
public property promotes efficiency and reduces rent seeking. 
 
1. Redistribution and “Fairness” 
 
A common objection to the use of market mechanisms to allocate 
regulatory permits and public property with public access is that imposing 
monetary charges disadvantages those who are poor.  As discussed above, 
the main objection to congestion pricing in the United States 329 and China330 
is that such fees pose barriers to travel for those with less income.  Public 
resistance to large monetary charges attached to vehicle licenses under the 
Shanghai auction also accounted for the switch to the free lottery allocation 
in subsequent vehicle license quotas.331  The practice of charging steep entry 
fees to Chinese natural, cultural, and historic tourist attractions has prompted 
Chinese commentators to express skepticism about the market allocation of 
the “public property” of these national monuments because of the resulting 
social inequality.332 
These criticisms of inequality are misconceived.  First, conceiving of 
public property as not including public access does not preclude the 
government from implementing redistributive activities to aid the poor.  Just 
as governments can institute social welfare programs that directly allocate 
cash and other property to certain target communities such as the poor, 
disabled, or aged, governments may allocate valuable regulatory permits to 
those targeted communities on the basis of express redistributive goals.  The 
restraint resulting from the proposed framework is merely a requirement to 
expressly declare the redistributive purposes whenever beneficial regulatory 
actions are undertaken, i.e., when regulatory permits are allocated without 
imposing the appropriate charges or fees based on the value received by the 
beneficiaries.  It is true that vague redistributive justifications may simply be 
offered and political checks may not be sufficiently robust to ensure the 
requirement serves any meaningful constraints, which is evidenced by the 
sometimes blatant wealth transfers undertaken by the government to 
influential interests groups.333  Nonetheless, this is an improvement because 
the prima facie expectation that appropriate charges are based on the benefits 
received should raise the bar for government justification of beneficial 
                                                      
329  See Sun, supra note 24, at 284; Nash, supra note 7, at 726-27; Schuitema, supra note 1, at 107-09. 
330  See Lin Junhui et al., supra note 104; Ma Lianhua, supra note 103. 
331  Zhou An, supra note 66. 
332  Xiao Zecheng, supra note 265, at 38.  
333  See Kelly, supra note 231, at 37-38.   
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regulatory decisions.  The government must not merely articulate some form 
of public interest consideration to justify the regulatory decision (as they do 
now); instead, the government should have to explain why these public 
interests considerations trump the need to collect the charges.  The increase 
in public and media scrutiny that is associated with the outrage over the 
losses of public property to the benefit of private entities also helps to rein in 
potentially massive wealth transfers in the realm of regulatory actions. 
Second, even if a market allocation mechanism is adopted for the 
allocation of the public property, redistributive goals to the poor are not 
necessarily advanced under a non-market-based allocation mechanism.  The 
alternative to a market-based allocation is often not targeted redistributive 
efforts, but merely “free access” or allocation without charges.  The absence 
of charges does not necessarily benefit the poor.  In the case study of the 
allocation of Chinese vehicle licenses, the lucky winners under the lottery 
system in Beijing received their licenses for free, but there is little to suggest 
that they deserved the substantial economic value deriving from the 
licenses.334  Allocation based on standing in line or lottery merely grants the 
windfall profit to those who are quick to line up in the queue or who are 
lucky, as noted in the Singapore legislative debate.335  Similarly, allowing 
public property to be allocated through “public access” favors segments of 
the population that are poised to exploit the resources.  In the case of 
fisheries, that may simply include large corporations with the capital and 
expertise to out fish local and native fishermen.336  In the case of roads, time 
becomes the price charged for road utilization.337  This does not benefit the 
poor, particularly when the rich can “save” time by purchasing property in a 
better location.338 
If redistribution were a priority, collecting the market fees and 
redistributing the collected funds would provide a more effective means to 
redistribute wealth.  Shanghai’s practice of using the proceeds from the 
auction to subsidize important public transportation initiatives, such as 
rebates for public transportation transfers, free public transportation for the 
                                                      
334  See supra Part II.C.1. 
335  Certificate of Entitlement, supra note 12, at col. 729 (Mah Bow Tan). 
336  See Fikret Berkes, Native Subsistence Fisheries: A Synthesis of Harvest Studies in Canada, 43 
ARCTIC 35, 40-41 (1990); O. Hertz &  F. O. Kapel, Commercial and Subsistence Hunting of Marine 
Mammals, 15 AMBIO 144, 146 (1986). 
337  See Nash, supra note 7, at 688-89; Small, supra note 6, at 410-11. 
338  Cf. Small, supra note 6, at 413-14 (“Although the complexity of shifts in labor, housing, and land 
markets makes these [redistribution] effects [of congestion pricing] hard to predict, the direct effects would 
hit relatively hardest at low-income people.  Not only does road use rise less than proportionally with 
income, but also time savings are less valuable to low-income than to high-income drivers.”). 
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elderly and subsidies for remote public transportation routes 339 does much 
more to help the socioeconomically disadvantaged communities than the 
random lottery allocation mechanisms in Beijing and Guiyang.  Similarly, 
the reduction of broad-based taxes under Singapore’s practice of charging 
substantial fees for beneficial regulatory actions helps to keep general taxes 
low.  Singapore has managed to consistently maintain a healthy budget 
surplus while enjoying some of the lowest income and corporate tax rates in 
the world, particularly compared with the United States and European 
countries.340  More tellingly, unlike in the United States,341 the amount of 
government fees and charges collected are significant in comparison with 
the revenue from general taxes and is one of the key components to these 
budget surpluses. 342   This budget surplus has allowed the Singapore 
government to undertake massive redistribution projects, including 
providing affordable public housing for 80% of its densely populated urban 
population and a substantial government subsidy on education.343 
This healthy fiscal position is important for effective redistribution 
because revenue generated through the sale of public resources and assets 
does not share the same distorting incentives of conventional taxes. 344  
Indeed, taxation is often viewed simply as a revenue-producing device but is 
in fact one of the far-reaching powers of the government that can impose 
real costs on private property rights.345  Some scholars consider taxation as a 
form of eminent domain, even arguing that some tax laws are actually 
unconstitutional takings.346  Broadly based taxes such as income taxes and 
corporate taxes do not treat all taxpayers fairly but benefit certain groups of 
                                                      
339  Storm of Vehicle Purchase Restriction is Imminent, supra note 68. 
340  Budget surplus averages around 2-3% of GDP, with top marginal income tax rate at 21% and 
corporate tax rate at 18%.  See Jianlin Chen, supra note 193, at 49-53; HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, 
COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION 162-64 (2d ed. 2004). 
341  WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 2 (14th ed. 2006) (“Other” constitutes 
about 4% of the total federal revenue.  The rest are “income taxes” (55%), “social insurance” (38%), and 
“excise taxes” (3%));  AULT & ARNOLD,  supra note 340, at 140-41. 
342  “Fees & Charges” typically constitute about 10% to 15% of the total government operating 
revenue.  See SINGAPORE DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, YEARBOOK OF STATISTICS SINGAPORE, 2012, 222 
(2012); SINGAPORE DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, YEARBOOK OF STATISTICS SINGAPORE, 1997, 192 (1998).  
When compared to revenue from corporate and personal income tax, the ratio is about 1:4 (i.e., income tax 
revenue is 4 times more than fees and charges).   
343  SINGAPORE DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, YEARBOOK OF STATISTICS SINGAPORE, 2012, 120-24 & 
269-70 (2012). 
344  See Hazlett, Muňoz & Avanzini, supra note 248, at ¶26-27; Hazlett, Porter & Smith, supra note 
248, at 140. 
345  See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1412, 1416 (2006).  
346  Id. at 1432-33. 
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citizens at the expense of others.347  Tax laws are subject to intense lobbying 
pressures, often resulting in provisions catering to interest groups at the 
expense of general taxpayers.348 
In summary, while redistribution is ultimately dependent on political 
will rather than how public property is conceived, the proposed public 
property framework and the corresponding use of market mechanisms are 
more effective and efficient in generating resources that can be utilized for 
redistribution. 
 
2. Revenue Generation vs. Public Interest 
 
Another critique points to the perverse incentives created by the 
potential for revenue generation when regulatory permits and public-access 
property are conceived as “property” that could be “sold” to private entities.  
This is socially harmful because it may lead to an increase in unnecessary 
regulation as a result of the government’s financial incentives in imposing 
regulatory regimes that charge recipients for regulatory permits or licenses.  
The government may also skew the design and exercise of regulatory 
regimes towards revenue generation instead of genuine public interest.  In 
the context of spectrum auctions, commentators have highlighted the danger 
of revenue generation distracting government regulatory authorities from 
enhancing the overall efficiency of society, such as ensuring that resources 
are fully utilized and maintaining a competitive market. 349   This is 
particularly relevant because the regulatory design underlying the permit 
auctions heavily influences the bids made, unlike the sale of a government-
owned physical commodity (such as oil or timber).350  Revenue-generating 
tactics that are not consistent with general social welfare include delaying 
the auctions (to wait for higher bids), high reserve pricing, and reducing the 
number of permits offered for auction (possibly granting monopoly power 
through licensing). 351   Administrative auction can also impose artificial 
scarcity to drive up prices, leading to insufficient supply of the regulatory 
permits.352  Chinese commentators have also criticized the Shanghai vehicle 
license auction on the grounds that such maximizing of government funds 
                                                      
347  See Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 292 (1990); 
RONALD F. KING, MONEY, TIME & POLITICS 34 (1993). 
348  See KING, supra note 347, at 34. 
349  See Hazlett, Muňoz & Avanzini, supra note 248, at ¶98-103; Goodman, supra note 243, at 360-63. 
350  See Hazlett, Muňoz & Avanzini, supra note 248, at ¶38; Goodman, supra note 243, at 360-61. 
351  See Hazlett, Muňoz & Avanzini,  supra note 248, at ¶28-29; Hazlett, Porter & Smith, supra note 
248, at 140. 
352  See Hazlett, Porter & Smith, supra note 248, at 148. 
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will distract the government from achieving public welfare.353  In a similar 
vein, several Chinese academics have begun advocating public access as the 
main criterion for the classification of property as public in an attempt to 
limit governmental ability to utilize market mechanisms (i.e., charging 
market rates) in allocating property that should properly be freely accessible 
by the public.354 
The danger of governments pursuing revenue at the expense of public 
welfare is a legitimate concern.  However, the abuse of government power is 
neither caused nor aggravated by the proposed conceptualization of public 
property.  The cause of revenue generation dominating the government 
calculus in the United States is the budget deficit.  It was the fiscal crisis in 
the early 1990s that finally induced the implementation of the auction for the 
telecommunication spectrum licenses.355  Similarly, faced with dwindling 
budgets, local governments in the United States have integrated land use 
planning and zoning efforts with municipal financial planning goals, 
resulting in “regulat[ing] for revenue.”356  A consistent approach towards 
recognizing the “public property” nature of regulatory permits may actually 
reduce perverse incentives to generate government revenue at the expense of 
social welfare.  As discussed in the previous section, the aggressive use of 
market mechanisms in Singapore has generated substantial revenue that 
helps lead to healthy budget surpluses in a comparatively low-tax 
environment. 357   In such a context, the distorting pressure to generate 
revenue in the design and implementation of any particular regulatory policy 
is reduced.  It is noteworthy that while congestion pricing in Singapore is 
conceived of as the market allocation of a public property, it is not a revenue 
generating measure because of the greater reduction in road and vehicle 
taxes.358  Indeed, the lack of a budgetary deficit crisis in Singapore has 
allowed the government to simultaneously increase the number of COEs 
issued even though such increase in supply is likely to reduce revenue from 
the COE auction.359 
                                                      
353  Peng Xingting, supra note 71.  
354  Zhang Jianwen, supra note 265, at 118; Xiao Zecheng, supra note 265, at 37-38. 
355  See Goodman, supra note 243, at 354 (2009); Crawford, supra note 236, at 967, 973-74. 
356  See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying for 
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at 423-24. 
357  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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Moreover, the greater risk to improper exercise of regulatory power is 
not government regulating for financial gains, but rent-seeking by special 
interests groups.  Regulatory schemes that adopt market allocation and 
generate revenues for the government typically trigger massive popular 
objections, as evidenced by the political resistance to implement congestion 
charges in the United States or the popular objections against auction 
allocation of vehicle licenses in China. 360   Conversely, rent-seeking is 
rampant in regulatory regimes that allocate regulatory permits and licenses 
without charge, resulting in real and substantial economic benefits to the 
recipients.  Throughout history and particularly in the modern administrative 
state, the state has an indispensable and crucial role in the establishment and 
rearrangement of property rights through its regulatory power.361  When the 
state has the power to manipulate or redistribute individuals’ property rights, 
the risk of rent -seeking arises where special interest groups devote resources 
to persuade the state to manipulate or redistribute property rights in their 
favor.362  The vigorous political lobbying in the pre-auction allocation of the 
telecommunication spectrum363 or the unfortunately common corruption in 
the grant of development permits364 demonstrates the greater danger of rent-
seeking in thwarting the proper exercise of regulatory power. 
In this regard, conceptualizing regulatory permits as public property 
that prima facie should not be given away to private entities actually helps to 
reduce corruption and rent-seeking.  As observed by Nobel Prize laureate in 
economics, Ronald Coase, “if these rights were disposed of to the highest 
bidder, the main reason for these improper activities [of improper influences 
exercised by politicians and businessman] would disappear.”365  Similarly, 
Bruce Yandle noted that “[s]adly for special interest groups, user fees tend to 
maintain competition and generate no rents for [these groups].”366  Interest 
groups would be much more careful to lobby for government actions if they 
are expected to pay for these benefits.367   
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Of course, the recognition that allocation of regulatory permits is 
essentially the allocation of public property does not in itself eradicate 
corruption and rent-seeking.  Corruption remains a persistent problem in the 
realm of government contracts and the sale of government assets368 despite 
the ostensible jurisprudential emphasis on the need for government to obtain 
best value for the public funds and property.369  Nonetheless, the expectation 
and recognition that beneficial regulatory actions should not be dispensed 
free-of-charge in the absence of explicit redistributive considerations is at 
least an improvement on the current situation in which no such scrutiny 
automatically attaches to regulatory decisions. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
A comparative analysis of the prevalent use of market-based 
mechanisms in allocating public resources and regulatory permits in the 
regulatory landscape of Singapore presents a paradox because Singapore’s 
regulatory approach is both more market-oriented than the United States and 
more oriented towards public property protection than socialist China.  In 
truth, the paradox is easily resolved through the lens of public property.  
Public property, the otherwise sacred poster child of socialist regimes, is 
simply a form of property.  If market mechanisms represent the most 
effective form of property allocation to ensure that public property is not 
squandered—and often they do—then an emphasis on public property 
protection will necessarily imply the widespread use of market 
mechanisms.370  Similarly, the use of market mechanisms to assign public 
resources and regulatory permits to the highest value user would also 
inevitably generate substantial revenue for the public coffers.  From this 
perspective, it is not surprising that Singapore is the shinning epitome of 
both socialist public property protection and market-oriented regulatory 
approach.  One should inevitably lead to the other, and vice versa. 
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However, a reorientation of public property is necessary to achieve the 
goals of efficiency and public revenue fairness.  The definition of “property” 
in public property must be sufficiently broadened to include regulatory 
permits and other regulatory actions that bestow substantial economic value 
to the recipients.  This is crucial to avoid unfortunate and unnecessary losses 
of efficiency and public revenue such as the lottery allocation of China’s 
vehicle license quota and the pre-1993 allocation of U.S. telecommunication 
spectrum licenses.  Both scenarios are in part caused by the failure to 
appreciate that public property allocation is at stake.  Similarly, the “public” 
in public property should not be defined by public access.  Public access is 
merely a form of allocation.  It may prove to be the most efficient allocation 
mechanism through the ages, but this historical tradition should not impede 
adoption of other allocation mechanisms upon alterations in use patterns 
arising from technological advancement and socioeconomic changes.  The 
severe congestion problem has rendered road usage in densely populated 
urban areas prime candidates for a switch from public free access to market-
based allocation mechanisms.  In a world of ever increasing scarcity of 
previously abundant resources, the refined public property framework 
proposed in this article provides greater conceptual clarity in resource 
allocation and externality management. 
 
